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VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
"Great nations, like great men, should keep their word."' Jus-
tice Black, in his dissent in Federal Power Commission v. Tuscarora
Indian Nation, encapsulated the failures of two centuries of the
United States' relationship with its native Indians.2 Since estab-
lishing the first tentative treaties of the Revolutionary era, the
United States has made many broad promises to the Indians.3
These promises, detailed first in treaties and later in statutes, drew
the government and the Indians into a fiduciary relationship. Al-
though this relationship would have consequences for fed-
eral/Indian interactions, raising the level of care with which the
government would treat its native beneficiaries, its full potential
has remained unrealized. 4 In 1960, Justice Black's simple principle
fell on deaf ears. Today, courts have the opportunity to listen.
The scope of the federal/Indian fiduciary relationship has es-
caped precise definition in part because of the elusive nature of all
fiduciary interactions. A fiduciary relationship, like that between
the federal government and the Indians, usually overlays statuto-
rily regulated ties between parties in trust-based relationships. 5
The fiduciary relationship regulates the manner in which the fidu-
ciary fulfills legal duties to the dependant party,6 providing a "veil"
through which courts view the fiduciary's execution of other, more
specific obligations.7 Because of its lack of independent shape, this
notion of heightened responsibility may appear a "concept in search
1. Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 142 (1960) (Black, J.,
dissent).
2. The use of the term "Indian" as opposed to Native or Aboriginal American reflects the
language of prevailing legal definitions. See infra note 29.
3. See Cobell v. Babbitt, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1, 53-54 (D.D.C. 1999) (noting the government's
recognition of its failure to keep promises to the Indians, including the declaration of Secre-
tary of Interior Bruce Babbitt that the problems between the government and the Indians
existed long before any current officer's lifetime).
4. See Peter D. Maddaugh, Definition of Fiduciary Duty, in SPECIAL LECTURES OF THE
LAW SOCIETY OF UPPER CANADA, FIDUCIARY DUTIES 15, 16 (1990) [hereinafter SPECIAL
LECTURES] ('The term 'fiduciary' is not one used by ordinary people. It is only used by lawyers.
This in itself should arouse our suspicions.").
5. See P. D. FINN, FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS 2 (1977) [hereinafter FINN, OBLIGATIONS].
These relationships include a range of close interactions from doctor to patient, guardian to
ward, trustee to beneficiary, and even parent to child. See infra Part V.B.
6. See FINN, OBLIGATIONS, supra note 5, at 2 (explaining that fiduciary responsibility
arises because of, not independent of other statutory responsibilities).
7. See id. at 1.
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of a principle. '8 In fact, fiduciary responsibilities require substan-
tive principles, existing only in symbiotic relationship with the firm
guidelines of trust, agency, tort and contract law.9
This notion, adopted from equity's breach of confidence con-
cerns, 10 boasts broad utilization in modern law.11 The two basic fi-
duciary duties, the duty of care and the duty of loyalty,12 evolved
from courts' progressive generalizations of the requirements con-
trolling the interactions between certain parties. 13 As courts grew to
expect high standards of care and loyalty in specific types of inter-
actions, like those between a doctor and patient or a trustee and
beneficiary, 14 they imposed a higher level of responsibility in in-
stances in which the parties, based on the type of relationship en-
tered, would expect such a standard to apply (the archetypal
model). 15 Courts soon expanded this notion, attaching fiduciary re-
sponsibilities to non-archetypal arrangements in which the purpose
of the relationship suggested elements of reliance and high expecta-
tions for loyalty and care (the purpose model). 16 Even if a relation-
ship did not fit the archetypal or purpose models, courts often found
facts or circumstances that could impose fiduciary responsibilities
(the circumstantial model). 17 When a relationship included ele-
ments of dominance, influence, vulnerability, trust, or dependency,
8. P.D. Finn, The Fiduciary Principle, in EQUITY, FIDUCIARIES, AND TRUSTS 55 (T.G.
Youdan, ed., 1989) [hereinafter Finn, Principle].
9. See id. This list is not intended to be exclusive but rather demonstrative. Where
substantive law binds parties to a particular set of actions, fiduciary law will guide the man-
ner in which those actions must be performed. The lack of principle notion misconstrues the
symbiotic attachment of fiduciary duties, insisting that because the duties cannot exist inde-
pendent of other substantive regulations, they lack substance. The role of the fiduciary obli-
gation, however, is not to create an independent relationship, but to ensure that existing rela-
tionships are carried out with the highest degree of integrity. Their "piggy-backed" structure,
rather than weakening their substantive impact, increases their effectiveness, extending their
protections to many diverse areas of law.
10. See id. at 69.
11. See id. at 72. The first noted use of the "fiduciary" label occurred in 1717. See L.S.
Sealy, Fiduciary Relationship, 1962 Cambridge L.J. 69, 72 n. 11 (citing Bishop of Winchester
v. Knight, I.P. Wins. 406, 407 (1717)).
12. See Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988
DUKE L.J. 879, 880.
13. See Finn, Principle, supra note 8, at 42.
14. See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 795 (1983) [hereinafter
Frankel, Fiduciary Law].
15. See Finn, Principle, supra note 8, at 46.
16. If, for instance, a relationship is entered with the intent of benefiting only one party,
the court will presume a fiduciary duty has been undertaken by the non-benefiting party. See
id. at 3-4 (commenting on the "self-less" nature of the fiduciary's agreement).
17. See id. at 41; see also Ronald G. Slaught, Proving a Breach of Fiduciary Duty, in
SPECIAL LECTURES, supra note 4, at 39 (noting the existence of a fiduciary relationship is a
question of law, but one that remains highly dependent on fact and circumstance).
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courts frequently applied fiduciary obligations to the substantive
statutory guidelines. 18 The expansions of fiduciary responsibility,
however, were not unlimited: a relationship found fiduciary in one
respect may not be so characterized in other aspects. In the words
of L.S. Sealy, one "cannot assume that what is fiduciary for one
purpose is fiduciary for all purposes."19
The government's relationship with the Indians touches all
three forms of fiduciary obligations. Historically, courts have recog-
nized the relationship between the government and the Indians as
deserving some form of special attention;20 thus, it may arguably fit
the archetypal model. Additionally, the government has persis-
tently characterized the arrangement as serving the best interests
of the Indians, 21 implicating application of the purpose model. Fi-
nally, the appearance of elements of reliance, trust, vulnerability,
dominance, and influence22 suggests the third, circumstantial, fidu-
ciary relationship. 23
After years of changing attitudes, shifting policies, and
varying standards, the government, more often than not, has failed
to keep its pledges to its Indian beneficiaries. Despite the strong
evidence of a fiduciary tie, courts, relying on a distinction between
the typical common law fiduciary relationship and the "unique" re-
lationship between the government and the Indians, historically
have refused to hold the government to the full fiduciary standards
imposed on other, private fiduciaries. 24
18. See Finn, Principle, supra note 8, at 46. Some courts require additional evidence that
reliance or dependence has resulted, see Peter D. Maddaugh, Definition of Fiduciary Duty, in
SPECIAL LECTURES, supra note 4, at 22, while others seek confirming evidence of party expec-
tations, see Finn, Principle, supra note 8, at 46.
19. See Sealy, supra note 11, at 81; see also FINN, OBLIGATIONS, supra note 5, at 4 (the
"distinctive feature of the modern law is that each duty itself defines the type of relationship
to which it applies"). Although courts have enumerated certain "specific" fiduciary duties, such
as the duty not to take an opportunity for one's own interests instead of for the interest of the
beneficiary. Fiduciary law remains an overlay to more definite substantive arrangements.
These enumerated duties are not a new common law, but rather examples of the types of be-
havior that would conform to the high standards of fiduciary duty. See Maddaugh, SPECIAL
LECTURES, supra note 4 at 27 n.54.
20. See Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942) (noting the unique
character of the federal/Indian relationship).
21. See infra note 62, 72-74, 78 and accompanying text (describing the government's
claimed good intentions in instituting Indian land reform).
22. See Seminole Nation, 316 U.S. at 297; Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Mor-
ton, 354 F. Supp. 252, 256 (D.D.C. 1973); Navajo Tribe of Indians v. Uiited States, 364 F.2d
320, 322 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
23. See FINN, OBLIGATIONS, supra note 5, at 4.
24. See infra notes 152-60 and accompanying text (describing the court's interpretation of
the relationship as a source of power for Congress over the Indians and announcing a pre-
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Recognizing this judicial failure, the Supreme Court in 1983
asserted the need for stricter scrutiny of the government's trustee-
ship of Indian interests,2 5 outlining the specific circumstances un-
der which full, common law fiduciary obligations would apply to the
government's treatment of Indians.26 Modern courts, however,
rarely find these few specific circumstances satisfied. Despite the
two hundred year development of a fiduciary relationship, Indian
plaintiffs currently bear the burden of proving that courts should
hold the government to the heightened standards of the 1983 deci-
sions.27 By requiring plaintiff Indians to bear the burden of proving
the Court's newly enunciated standards for specificity, comprehen-
sive governmental control, and exclusive relationship, 28 courts place
a sizeable hurdle between the Indian beneficiary and the modern
law's promised fiduciary protection.
Viewed through the veil of fiduciary law, and in light of the
long history of federal/Indian interaction and the recent Court
holdings, the current allocation of the burden of proof appears sur-
prisingly unsupportive of Indian interests. Courts have recognized
not just a specific statutory relationship between the government
and the Indians, but also an underlying, historical fiduciary bond.
Although this bond is insufficient to support fiduciary duties inde-
pendent of more definite statutory or control-based responsibilities,
it warrants a presumption in favor of the Indians that the neces-
sary specific obligations exist and that common law-level fiduciary
standards should apply to government behavior.
This Note advocates the reallocation of the burden of proof in
Indian claims against the federal government, urging the adoption
of a presumption of common law fiduciary standards for govern-
ment actions in Indian affairs. This presumption would require the
government, not the Indians, to shoulder the often heavy burden of
proving that the precise contours of the federal/Indian relationship
do not include a specific interaction when the government deems its
control too incomplete or too inclusive to justify imposition of such
rigid duties.
sumption of good faith on the part of Congress rather than a requirement that Congress ad-
here to strict fiduciary standards of behavior).
25. See infra Part II.
26. See United States v. Mitchell ("Mitchell Ir'), 463 U.S. 206 (1983); Nevada v. United
States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983). Through the Mitchell I and Nevada decisions, the Court cur-
tailed government power over the Indians, asserting the duty side of the federal/Indian fiduci-
ary relationship.
27. See generally Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 225; Nevada, 463 U.S at 141-42.
28. See Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 225; Nevada, 463 U.S. at 141-42.
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Section II offers a basic overview of the foundations of Indian
law. Though far from complete, this Section explores the develop-
ment of the federal/Indian fiduciary relationship through three
major stages of congressional policies: the treaty period, the era of
allotment, and the modern era. Section III reviews the decisions
that first identified the federal/Indian relationship, laying the
foundations for the Court's most recent interpretation. Section IV
examines the Supreme Court's crucial 1983 decisions, United States
v. Mitchell ("Mitchell IT') and Nevada v. United States, from which
the modern fiduciary standards stem. It negotiates the potential
theoretical variations of the "new" standards for federal/Indian in-
teraction, finding a workable interpretation in several subsequent
lower court decisions. Section V briefly addresses the role of the
burden of proof as both a tool for legal change and a means of pro-
tecting fiduciary standards, and advocates a shift in the burden of
proof for federal/Indian claims in response to the Court's acknowl-
edgment of an existing fiduciary relationship.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL/INDIAN
RELATIONSHIP
A. The First Encounters
The Continental Congress first dealt with the Indians29 in a
series of Revolutionary War agreements. 30 These "treaties" sought
29. The concept of an "Indian" traverses, as most of federal Indian law, a maze of regula-
tions, definitions and policies. The complexity of the Indian identity illustrates the variables
and inconsistencies that color most federal/Indian interactions. The Department of the Inte-
rior (DOI) constructs the Indian identity from a variety of factors, including tribal membership
and race. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 4-5 (1986)
[hereinafter FEDERAL INDIAN LAW]. These characteristics, however, are neither precise nor
definitive. Members of tribes lacking formal governmental recognition must prove tribal exis-
tence according to race, leadership and location before establishing their individual claims.
Such tribes may be recognized by the Secretary of the Interior or formally incorporated under
the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. See CONFERENCE OF WESTERN ATTORNEYS GENERAL,
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK 31-33 (Julie Wrend & Clay Smith chief eds., 1993) [herein-
after DESKBOOK]. Even a member of an accepted tribe who has rejected the tribal lifestyle may
not, according to Congress, be an Indian. See FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra at 5. Congress
construes rejection of reservation living as rejection of tribal, and Indian, identity. See id.
Although biology generally identifies an Indian, see id. at 6 (discussing the use of race in es-
tablishing Indian identity), Congress will only assume a person is an Indian if that person can
demonstrate ancestral ties to a pre-discovery American and her community's acceptance of her
as an Indian. See id.
This multi-faceted definition leads even its creators to inconsistent applications. For
example, while the General Allotment Act ("GAA") excluded biological Indians who had al-
1642 [Vol. 53:5:1637
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affirmations of friendship, or at least neutrality, from individual
tribes. 31 Despite their age and specificity, these early treaties re-
main good law,32 providing a backdrop that supports and reconciles
more recent legislation.33
Following the British model, 34 early agreements opened
channels of communication, secured goodwill through the exchange
ready left the reservation, it included white reservation residents who had adopted the ways of
the tribe. See 25 US.C. § 331, et seq. (1887); FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra at 7. This distinction
becomes particularly ironic in light of the original goal of Indian identification: separating the
Indians entitled to special governmental benefits from the white population that lacked the
same tradition of abuse. See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 2 (1986).
Nevertheless, should the non-reservation individual inherit previously allotted Indian land,
government trust regulations would apply to the individual's possession of that land. See id. at
7 n.11.
The concept of Indian identity may vary even from this definition. Modern parlance
functionally defines the legal Indian, rejecting the cultural/ethnic angle of earlier definitions.
See COHEN at 2 (explaining that the term 'Indian" may carry either an ethnological or a legal
connotation). The Conference of Western Attorneys General, for instance, rejects all biological
and lifestyle criteria, declaring an Indian a person with whom the government has a special,
trust-based relationship. See DESKBOOK, supra at 28 (referring to Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S.
535, 551-53 (1974); Board of County Comm'rs v. Seber, 318 U.S. 705, 718 (1943)). Similarly,
the modern definition of tribe, as expressed in 25 CFR § 83.7(a)(1991), includes repeated iden-
tification by federal authorities and a long-standing relationship with state and local govern-
mental units based on Indian status among the determinate factors of tribal identification.
See id. at 33. These definitions present a stark contrast to Congress's early laws, designed,
without specific definition, for those the public considered Indians. See FEDERAL INDIAN LAw,
supra at 4, 10. The word "Indian" has become a construct and creation of the federal govern-
ment, reflecting the profound extent to which the lives of those who bear the label have come
under governmental control. The tendency to use this unruly historically legislated identi-
fier, "Indian," in part addresses concerns that any bloodline identifications risk equal protec-
tion challenges for racial favoritism. While Indian lineage and tribal recognition remain im-
portant, by emphasizing the existing federal/Indian relationship as a basis for new laws, Con-
gress can avoid a modern legislative pothole. See id. at 29-30. To understand the extent of
the government-Indian relationship, the defining characteristic of modern Indian life, it is
essential to first understand the framework from which that relationship has grown. See id. at
28.
30. See FRANCIs PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES: THE HISTORY OF A
POLITICAL ANOMALY 23 (1994).
31. See id. The use of the term "treaty" has caused a great deal of debate over the sover-
eign status of the Indian tribes at the time of the agreements. If, it is reasoned, the tribes
were originally recognized as independent nations (the typical parties to treaties) the govern-
ment cannot justify later treatment as dependent, conquered peoples. Importantly, at the
time of the American Revolution, the term "treaty" referred to a negotiation, not to a particu-
lar type of intergovernmental agreement. Thus, when Congress made an agreement with the
Indians on trade, allegiance, or later land, it appropriated funds and assigned delegates "to
treat" with particular tribes. While the resulting document would later be referred to as a
"treaty," the term denoted the product of the negotiation, not an international resolution. See
id. at 23-25.
32. See COHEN, supra note 29, at 33.
33. See id.
34. See id. During British control of the American colonies, the British government had
instituted a similar treaty system based on the exchange of gifts. See id.
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of gifts, and attempted to awe the Indians with the strength of the
American nation.3 5 Although the new government believed Euro-
pean discovery and American conquest validated its title to the In-
dians' land,36  the young nation could not yet defend its
acquisitions. 37 It needed peaceful deals with the Indians to protect
its interests.38
Those interests continued to expand, as did the government's
involvement in Indian affairs. By August of 1786, Congress claimed
full power over Indian relations. 39 It set up a system of districts
within which authorized superintendents would make necessary
deals with local tribes.4° Through these deals, Congress hoped to
address the concerns of two major groups pressing the boundaries
of Indian territory, 41 the traders and the settlers. Congress con-
strained traders by requiring licenses for all commercial transac-
tions with the Indians.42 The settlers, however, presented a greater
problem. They wanted the Indian's land. While Congress asserted
that, through discovery and conquest, it alone held title to these
lands, 43 it recognized the dangerous validity of the Indians' com-
peting occupancy claims.44 This dilemma became the key issue
shaping governmental Indian policies, from the post-Revolution pe-
riod to the present day.45
In the early years, Congress's need for geographical expan-
sion governed its approach to the land question. Although it recog-
35. See PRUCHA, supra note 30, at 25-26.
36. See DAVID H. GETCHES, ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 143, 145 (1979) (describing the
early Supreme Courts attempts to characterize the United States/Indian relationship). Ac-
cording to the theory, the Treaty of Paris transferred full title to the territory of the modern
continental United States to America. The Supreme Court later echoed this notion in Johnson
v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543 (1823).
37. See PRUCHA, supra note 30, at 53 (observing that the United States' early treaties
with the Indians did not ensure peace between the settlers and the Indians).
38. See id.
39. See id. This claim of power followed the delegation of duties originally established in
the Articles of Confederation. See FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 29, at 1.
40. See PRUCHA, supra note 30, at 53-54.
41. Indian territory is generally defined as that land belonging to the Indians by right of
occupancy, or that area in which Indians live and trade. See DESKBOOK, supra note 29, at 12,
13 n.2.
42. See COHEN, supra note 29, at xxv.
43. See supra note 36 (discussing the conquest theory of land ownership).
44. See DESKBOOK, supra note 29, at 40-41.
45. See id. at 39 (observing that "[]and occupancy or ownership issues have been a cen-
tral concern of Indian law since the Nation's founding"); see, e.g., Cobell v. Babbitt, 91 F. Supp.
2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999) (resolving the most recent controversy between the Indians and the gov-
ernment over the trust fund accounts in which the government holds proceeds from land allot-
ted to individual Indians over 200 years ago).
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nized the validity of Indian occupancy, 46 government representa-
tives, "treating"47 with the Indians for land, frequently reminded
the Indians of their defeat alongside the British, suggesting that
only because of its great benevolence would the new nation agree to
bargain with them.48 The Treaty of Hopewell, signed January 3,
1786, illustrates the typical terms of these first treaties. In it, the
government provided a boundary line behind which land would be
"reserved" for the Indians.49 Notably, this line involved a sizeable
cession of then-current Indian territory. 50 In exchange for the ceded
land, the government promised trinkets and protection. 51 The gov-
ernment's pledge of protection, however, was already in doubt.
Congress knew, even as it ratified these early agreements, that
white settlers would corrupt any negotiated boundary.5 2 Thus,
while it gained territory with each treaty, Congress could rely on
even greater gains from unlawful settlement extensions. Between
1778 and 1868, 53 Congress executed over 400 such treaties, greatly
increasing its control of Indian territory. 54 On the remaining Indian
lands, Congress placed alienation restrictions, ensuring its con-
tinuing supervision even where it lacked physical control.55 The
growing nation pushed further and further into Indian country,
legislating separation of the Indians from the ever-expanding white
settlements as it advanced.5 6
Congress's expansionist policies, however, fell quickly to dis-
favor. While 1887 marked the end of the treaty period,57 statutory
language from as early as 1867 condemned treating with the Indi-
46. See DESKBOOK, supra note 29, at 41.
47. See supra note 31 (explaining the origin and historical meaning of the term "treaty").
48. See PRUCHA, supra note 30, at 60-61.
49. See id. at 61.
50. See id. at 62 (observing that "[tihe land provisions of the treaty were in general accord
with the existing situation").
51. See id. at 61 (noting that the government provided $1,200 worth of presents for the
918 Indians who had participated in the treaty negotiations).
52. See id; see also Cobell v. Babbitt, 91 F. Supp. 1, 7 (D.D.C. 1999) (noting that during
the treaty period, "treaties and agreements were frequently violated or amended to reduce
Indian holdings and to open more land to non-Indian settlers").
53. See DESKBOOK, supra note 29, at 13.
54. See id. at 12. During the same period, Congress authorized the removal of all Indians
east of the Mississippi River to western lands. See id at 13.
55. See DESKBOOK, supra note 29, at 39; infra note 94 (describing the types of restrictions
Congress placed on Indian land transfers).
56. See DESKBOOK, supra note 29, at 13 (explaining that congressional policy was based
on "a desire to segregate tribes from interaction with non-Indian society except under tightly
regulated circumstances").
57. See id. at 9 (noting that 1887 marks the end of the "Trade and Intercourse Acts pe-
riod").
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ans and anticipated a new era of allotment and assimilation. 58 Al-
though Congress ultimately abandoned the formal practice of
treating with the Indians, it did so only while asserting that its
power over the Indians remained undiminished.5 9
B. The Era of Allotment
Early Indian policies addressed tribes individually, pursuing
a national policy of separation one tribe or region at a time. 60 After
the passage of the Dawes Act in 1887, however, the government
handled Indians primarily as a single group.61 Though continuing to
push for expansion, the government began to assimilate, rather
than separate, the nation's Indian occupants. 62
In 1823, Johnson v. M'Intosh63 had asserted the government's
sovereign right to extinguish Indian title, retaining, for the Indians,
only a right of occupancy. 64 While the government lauded this occu-
pancy right as the "sacred" equivalent of fee simple title, 65 designed
to protect the native residents from unprincipled white settlers, 66
the right slowly diminished as the young nation grew.67
The General Allotment Act ("GAA"), or Dawes Act, 68 passed in
February 1887, defined federal/Indian relations for this period. The
first general application statute to authorize individual allotments,
58. See COHEN, supra note 29, at 66.
59. See FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 29, at 25-26.
60. See supra Part II.A (describing the treaty process between the government and vari-
ous tribes).
61. The precise demarcation of the government's shift in policy towards Indian agree-
ments is elusive because even during the treaty period, Congress claimed power to legislate
Indian affairs. See FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 29, at 26. Although the actual shift
from treaty making to legislation was perhaps a gradual one, by the time the Dawes Act
passed in 1887, it had gathered the necessary momentum to reject fully the old policies. See
id. at 112, 114-15.
62. See id. at 115 (noting the government's belief that "civilizing" the Indians would not
only better serve the Indians' general welfare, but would also open more land to white set-
tlers).
63. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543 (1923).
64. See FEDERAL INDIAN LAw, supra note 29, at 18.
65. See id. at 19 (citing Mitchel v. United States, (9 Pet.) 711, 746 (1835)).
66. See id. at 18.
67. See infra notes 73-78, 91-92 (describing the increasingly detrimental effects of con-
gressional policies on Indian land rights).
68. General Allotment Act, 24 Stat. 388-91 (1887) reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED
STATES INDIAN POLICY, at 171 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter
DOCUMENTS].
1646 [Vol. 53:5:1637
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69 the GAA authorized the President to survey and divide previously
reserved Indian lands for distribution as individual parcels. 70 Ini-
tially, each reservation Indian could select a parcel to be held in
government trust for twenty-five years. 71 Less than twenty years
after the GAA's passage, however, Congress extended this trust pe-
riod indefinitely, granting discretion over the trust period to the
President. 72 Altering the provision, Congress expressed its concern
that the initial twenty-five year term would prove too brief a period
for Indians to adjust to the essential concept of individual property
ownership. 73 Congress decided, therefore, to alter the provision to
allow the government to remain trustee over the Indian land allot-
ments until each individual Indian became "competent" to manage
his own property.74
Once each member of the reservation tribe had an opportu-
nity to select a land parcel, the GAA allowed the U.S. to purchase
the remaining "surplus" lands. 75 Money from the purchase would
remain with the Department of Treasury, held in trust for the sell-
ing tribe. 76 By 1904, the government no longer sought Indian per-
mission before declaring surplus lands open to white
homesteaders. 77 The GAA, intended to facilitate private Indian
ownership, had instead shifted control of sixty percent of tribal
lands to government ownership. 78
The government's plan also failed to teach the Indians pri-
vate land homesteading skills v9 Although Congress intended the
Indians to maintain their allotments as individual properties, an
1891 amendment allowed the government to rent the property on
the Indian's behalf should the Indian beneficiary prove unable to
69. See DESKBOOK, supra note 29, at 16. Although some individual allotments had been
made under early treaties, the GAA provided the first comprehensive allotment system and is
thus credited with marking the shift in U.S. policy towards the Indians from one of separation
to one of assimilation. See COHEN, supra note 29, at 206 (discussing the 1798 treaty with the
Oneida Nation).
70. General Allotment Act, 24 Stat, 388 §1 (1887).
71. See id. § 5.
72. See FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 29, at 73.
73. See Note, Rethinking the Trust Doctrine in Federal Indian Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 422,
429 n.38 (1984).
74. See FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 29, at 74.
75. See infra notes 89-90, 105 and accompanying text (explaining the government's use of
the restricted Indian ownership to maintain possession of title to Indian lands).
76. See General Allotment Act, 24 Stat. 388 §5 (1887).
77. See DESKBOOK, supra note 29, at 19.
78. See id. The government purchased nearly all of the land in the present continental
United States during this period. See GETCHES, supra note 36, at 150.
79. See DESKBOOK, supra note 29, at 16 n.82.
20001 1647
1648 VANDERBILTLAWREVIEW [Vol. 53:5:1637
use the land.80 Many Indians used the new provision to transform
their land from a source of communal life to a source of individual
income.81 Despite government restrictions on the duration and pur-
poses of leases,82 these Indians surrendered their lands to govern-
ment rentals in exchange for quick cash.8 3 Without the support of
their traditional, communal livelihoods, Indian dependence on the
federal government increased.84 The twenty-five year (or longer)
trust provisions aggravated this dependence by preventing state
taxation on the Indian property during the period of trusteeship.8 5
Without a related source of tax income, states refused to supply
services to the Indians. 86 Soon, Indians had only the meager, fed-
eral-issue tools, seeds, and funds to facilitate the difficult transition
from tribal to individual economy.8 7 Combined with the withdrawal
of tribal lands through the surplus provision, this practice soon
withered Indian self-sufficiency. 88 The Department of Interior
would later comment that the control of tribal lands initiated dur-
ing this period provided the most fundamental expression of con-
gressional power over the Indians.8 9
In 1934, Congress passed the Wheeler-Howard Indian Reor-
ganization Act ("IRA"), ending the allotment program and author-
izing the Secretary of the Interior to return unclaimed surplus
lands to their original tribal occupants.9 0 The IRA appeared to re-
80. See id. at 17.
81. See id.
82. Provisions of the GAA and related legislation restricted leases according to purpose
(farming, grazing, or irrigation only), duration (5 to 10 years), and maker (often the allottee),
and required approval from the Secretary of the Interior, effectively returning control of any
Indian-made leases to the government. See FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 29, at 805-07.
83. See DESKBOOK, supra note 29, at 17.
84. See GETCHES, supra note 36, at 76 ("Some critics of the Allotment Act see it as an orgy
of exploitation, with Indian lands being singled out for sacrifice to the westward expansion.").
COHEN, supra note 29, at 216 (quoting commissioner Collier's Feb. 19, 1934 memorandum to
the House Committee on Indian affairs to emphasize that the Allotment Act not only stripped
the Indians of their property, but also weakened their social organization and diminished
Indian wealth).
85. See COHEN, supra note 29, at 212.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id. at 216; see also Cobell v. Babbitt, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 1999) (noting
that during this era the BIA became the crucial provider of food and goods to the tribes).
89. See FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 29, at 33-34. This control has, in the modern
era, created huge complications for the federal government. See Cobell, 91 F. Supp.2d at 17
n.14 (explaining that in the hundred years since most allotments were made, nearly seven
generations have divided and inherited portions of the trust land and noting that today's av-
erage parcel has over forty owners).
90. See Wheeler-Howard Indian Reorganization Act, 48 Stat. 948 §§1,3 (1934) reprinted
in DOCUMENTS, supra note 68, at 222.
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verse the GAA's assimilationist goals in favor of a return to Indian
control.91 In reality, however, the IRA perpetuated governmental
restrictions on Indian property alienation and prolonged the GAA's
trust periods, this time at Congress's discretion.9 2 The IRA rein-
forced these measures by declaring that even if unclaimed surplus
lands returned to tribal occupancy, title should remain with the
federal government.93 Although tribes could enhance their property
rights by incorporating under the IRA, governmental alienation re-
strictions remained on even incorporated tribal lands. 94 Despite an
"copt out" provision, allowing individual tribes to reject the stan-
dards of the new legislation, over sixty percent of the nation's In-
dian population agreed to the IRA's terms.95 The IRA espoused the
government's desire to restore tribal self-government and to end
direct supervision of Indian activities by Congress;9 6 in the area of
land management and Indian property rights, however, the IRA
merely reaffirmed the GAA's restrictive goals. 97
C. Indian Land Management
By the end of the 1930s, the combined GAA and IRA provi-
sions severely constrained the scope and terms of tribal land own-
ership.98 Although tribes could acquire land in a variety of ways,99
91. See COHEN, supra note 29, at 84-85 (discussing the reversal of GAA policies as the
major goal of the IRA).
92. See id. at 84 ("Section 2 extends, until otherwise directed by Congress, existing peri-
ods of trust and restrictions on alienation placed on Indian lands.")
93. See Wheeler-Howard Indian Reorganization Act, 48 Stat. 948, §§ 2,5 (1934) reprinted
in DOCUMENTS, supra note 68, at 222; see also FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 29, at 59.
94. These alienation provisions included restrictions on sale or mortgaging of the prop-
erty and on leases for periods of more than 10 years. See DESKBOOK, supra note 29, at 21-22.
95.See id. at 22.
96. See id. at 21-22. The Act did, in many ways, contribute to tribal self-government by
allowing for tribal elections and the creation of tribal charters.
97. See GETCHES, supra note 36, at 81-82. Despite the IRA's reforms of tribal administra-
tion, the land restrictions continued, exacerbating what has today become the most crucial
issue in federal/Indian relations. See supra note 45 (discussing the importance of the land
management issue).
98. The restrictions on alienation, enhanced by provisions in later tribal charters, control
land administration to this day. See FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 29, at 789 (discussing
the origin of modern restrictions in the provisions of early land allotments).
99. First, Congress could withdraw land from the public domain (all area not under pri-
vate deed within the United States and its territories, including both land and water), see
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 29, at 20, and reserve it for Indian use. Second, Congress
could purchase private lands available through voluntary sales or condemnations. While
these sales agreements did not denote the lands as "reservations," the use of the specific term
was unnecessary for effective reservation creation. In addition to these two major methods of
land acquisition, tribes could occupy new properties in four additional ways. The government
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the GAA and IRA assured ultimate title would remain with the
government. 100 Modern reservations, products of this system, only
faintly echo their original treaty form. Most include or enclose land
parcels held by non-members due to post-trust'0' or surplus sales
under the GAA.10 2 As the Department of the Interior observed, this
control is "perhaps the most fundamental expression" of Congres-
sional power over Indian affairs. 03
The same "fundamental" control extends to individual land
parcels. 104 Individually allotted lands also require secretarial ap-
proval for alienation or encumbrance of title. 10 5 These lands, often
referred to as "restricted" Indian lands, ultimately remain within
the government's grasp. 0 6 Congress can extend, modify, or remove
existing restrictions, or re-impose previously lifted restrictions. 107
Congress created the modern land management system to as-
similate the Indians while protecting them from "improvident" sales
of their newly assigned lands. 08 It later hoped the system would
could exchange private lands for public lands, consolidating those areas held for the Indians,
but preserving title in the government, or it could sell old reservation land and reinvest the
sale proceeds on behalf of the tribe for later purchase of new property. Finally, the govern-
ment could either restore previously removed tribal lands or, subject to congressional ap-
proval, transfer lands voluntarily relinquished by another tribe, the state or individuals. See
COHEN, supra note 29, at 296-98.
100. See Cobell v. Babbitt, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7-9 (D.D.C. 1999) (noting that after the pas-
sage of the two acts, the government held approximately 11 million acres of former Indian
land in individual trusts).
101. See supra note 29, at 46. The GAA provided a twenty-five year period during which
the government retained title in fee to the land. Although later amendments and the passage
of the IRA extended the trust period indefinitely, some Indians did gain full title to their al-
lotments after the expiration of the unamended restriction period. Many of these Indians sold
their part of the land to non-Indians, creating pockets of white settlement within the federal
reservation.
102. See id. at 46-47.
103. FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 29, at 33-34.
104. See id. at 58-59.
105. See id. at 72 (citing Arenas v. Preston, 181 F.2d 62 (9th Cir. 1950)).
106. See id. at 58-59 (identifying typical lease restrictions and authorization require-
ments).
107. See id. at 40. This ownership structure does not arise simply because the landowner
is an ethnological Indian. A person of Indian descent has the ability to own land freely in any
state. Only when that Indian has remained a part of a tribal-reservation group or receives
benefits from the government in relation to his/her Indian status will the listed restrictions
apply. See supra note 82 (listing typical restrictions). Thus only legally-defined Indian own-
ers possessing lands originally acquired during GAA allotment face these types of restrictions.
See FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 29, at 40. It is to this more restricted land ownership
that this Note will refer.
108. See id. at 84 ("This authority was given ... for the protection of the Indians against
their own improvidence and the designs of those who would obtain their property for inade-
quate compensation.") (quoting Anicker v. Gunsburg, 246 U.S. 110, 119-20 (1918)).
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divest the government of the responsibility developed during the
assimilation era.10 9 The government's responsibility under the sys-
tem, however, never decreased. Today, the remnants of the GAA
and the IRA weave a comprehensive pattern of continuing govern-
ment control around Indian land ownership. 110
This broad government control demands comprehensive ad-
ministration. The almost "all-inclusive" powers of the federal gov-
ernment over modern Indian life reside with the Secretary of the
Interior."' That delegation, however, has developed over a period of
many years. 112
The Continental Congress first appointed regional commis-
sioners to handle Indian interactions."13 By 1789, Congress reas-
signed control of Indian affairs to the War Department, reflecting
the contemporary view that the Indians were subjects of conquest-
potential security problems for the new nation. 1 4 Relations through
the War Department, however, were limited; the budget of 1791
appropriated only $39,424.71 for Indian affairs. 15 By 1832, Con-
gress designated a Commissioner for Indian Affairs within the War
Department. 16 Two years later, it transferred that position to the
Department of Interior, 17 establishing the modern Bureau of In-
dian Affairs ("BIA").118
109. See id. at 129 ('The bill now under consideration definitely puts an end to the allot-
ment system through the operation of which the Indians have parted with 90,000,000 acres of
their land in the last 50 years.") (quoting H.R. REP. No. 73-1804, at 6 (1934)).
110. This control is generally held to extend to tribal and individual funds as well as to
real property on the theory that most tribal revenue comes from rentals and royalties on the
allotted land. See id. at 39. Tribal funds raised from direct member donations are not subject
to this type of regulation, but funds held in the tribal treasury at the time of incorporation
under the 1934 IRA are included in the modern government trust. See id. at 62-63. Govern-
ment management of tribal funds raises little dispute so long as the funds are clearly ex-
pended for the benefit of the tribe. See id. at 39. The government has no direct control of a
tribe member's interest in tribal property, but, because Congress determines the statutory
definition of tribal membership for benefit and distribution purposes, it indirectly guides an
individual Indian's power to make any tribal claim. See id. at 43. Furthermore, Congress can
remove a party's claim to tribal property by negating their membership in the relevant tribe.
See id. at 44.
111. See id. at 49.
112. See id. at 215-21 (detailing the development of the BIA); see also infra text accompa-
nying notes 126-31.
113. See FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 29, at 215. Benjamin Franklin, Patrick Henry,
and James Wilson were among those first selected as commissioners. See id.
114. See id. at 216.
115. See id. at 217.
116. See id. at 218.
117. See id.
118. See id. at 219, 221. The modern era has seen a few legislative attempts to return to
tribal self government, most notably House Concurrent Resolution 108, passed on August 1,
1953, which listed tribes to be removed from federal supervision as soon as possible. See H.R.
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Today, the BIA lists three major goals: to create conditions
facilitating continuing Indian social, economic, and political ad-
justment to non-tribal life; to encourage tribal and individual self-
sufficiency; and to terminate federal supervision where possible. 119
In executing these goals, the BIA acts as trustee for individual and
tribal land and money, provides public services (health, education,
etc.) to the tribes, offers guidance to Indians leaving the reserva-
tions, and facilitates the return of property management and serv-
ice provision to the tribes. 120 While other agencies assist in these
areas, 121 primary responsibility for modern Indian affairs lies with
the BIA.122
This brief historical and administrative overview describes
the foundation from which the courts struggled to build a working
understanding of federal/Indian interaction. Within this framework
of changing policies and ever-expanding control, the courts found a
strong fiduciary relationship binding tribe to government and gov-
ernment to tribe. That relationship, permeating all aspects of fed-
erallIndian intercourse, structured judicial resolution of Indian
claims.
III. THE RESULTING RELATIONSHIP
A. The Marshall Era: The Guardian/Ward Model
The Supreme Court first addressed the developing fed-
eral/Indian relationship during the early 1800s. In 1823, Johnson v.
M'Intoshl23 affirmed U.S. sovereignty over former Indian lands, set-
ting the stage for closer examination of the federal/Indian relation-
ship, 124 a relationship Chief Justice Marshall, in a pair of cases
Con. Res. 108, 83rd Cong. (1953), reprinted in DOCUMENTS, supra note 68, at 233. Despite
these brief variances, the government maintains pervasive control of Indian affairs today.
119. See Mission Statement, Bureau of Indian Affairs, United States Department of the
Interior (visited Sept. 17, 2000) <http://www.doi.govlbialmission.html>.
120. See FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 29, at 263.
121. The Department of Treasury, for instance, handles accounts from royalties and rents,
while the Bureau of Land Management sells lands that tribes have ceded to the US. See id. at
267; see also Cobell v. Babbitt, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9-10 (D.D.C. 1999) (describing the roles of
other agencies, including the Office of Special Trustee, the Office of Trust Fund Management,
the Minerals Management Service, and the Office of Hearings and Appeals, in government
management of individual Indian trust accounts).
122. See FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 29, at 263.
123. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543 (1823).
124. See id. (basing title on the discovery and conquest of the American continent).
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during the 1830s, would describe as similar to that between ward
and guardian. 125
The first of these cases, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,126 chal-
lenged a Georgia statute abolishing the Cherokee claim to state
land. The Cherokees, originally residing throughout the southeast,
had retreated to Georgia during the early 1800s in face of the ever-
expanding United States. 127 Between 1827 and 1830, Georgia abol-
ished Cherokee government and legislated the distribution of In-
dian territory to white settlers. 128 In defense of their occupancy
rights, the Indians sued the state. 129 When the case reached the Su-
preme Court in 1831, Chief Justice John Marshall held that the
Court had no jurisdiction over the question raised.130 In dicta, how-
ever, he espoused a model of the federal/Indian relationship that
would shape legal rhetoric for decades. 1 1 Marshall explained that
the relationship between the Indians and the government was
unique, "[resembling] that of a ward to his guardian."'13 2 He ex-
panded on his analogy, noting that the Indians "[looked] to [the]
government for protection; [relied] upon its kindness and its power;
[appealed] to it for relief to their wants; and [addressed] the presi-
dent as their great father."'133 While his comments were intended to
distinguish Indian tribes from foreign nations,134they soon outgrew
the confines of their immediate context. An unwitting Marshall had
definitively characterized federal/ Indian relations.13 5
The following year, Georgia's attempts to regulate Indian
country again drew legal challenge. This time, a white missionary
protested his arrest for residing on an Indian reservation without a
state license. 136 In Worcester v. Georgia,8 7 the Court reaffirmed its
description of the federal/Indian relationship as that of a stronger
guardian state to a weaker, but independent, Indian government. 3 8
The court emphasized the responsibility of the dominant power to
125. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5. Pet. ) 1, 17 (1831).
126. Id.
127. See GETCHES, supra note 36, at 158.
128. See id.
129. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 1.
130. See id. at 20.
131. See id. at 17-18.
132. Id. at 17.
133. Id.
134. See id. at 18 (explaining that the tribes were independent, but within the reaches of
U.S. sovereignty).
135. See id.
136. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 529 (1832).
137. Id. at 515.
138. See id. 560-61.
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protect its weaker subsidiary. 139 Striking down the state license re-
quirement, the court asserted the federal government's sole
authority over Indian affairs. 14°
In both Cherokee Nation and Worcester, Marshall took a
"middle of the road"141 approach to Indian status, neither acknowl-
edging complete tribal independence nor denying the existence of
self-contained Indian nations. 142 The Indians, in Marshall's view,
were America's weaker allies. They were not government depend-
ents, but rather recipients of government protection. 4 3 The fiduci-
ary relationship Marshall conceived in these first cases ascribed to
the government both a political duty and a moral commitment to
the Indians.'4 This moral commitment, however, would not with-
stand the constant pressures of the land-hungry new nation. Where
the Marshall Court contemplated a federal/Indian relationship cen-
tered on the protection of the Indians, the Justices of the next era
would view the relationship not as a source of responsibility, but as
an opportunity and justification for Congress' self-serving Indian
policies.
B. The Fiduciary Relationship as a Source of Plenary Power
As the Allotment Era dawned, the Court magnified the scope
of the guardian-ward relationship, 145 turning the protective fiduci-
ary "shield" of the Cherokee Cases into a formidable congressional
"sword."146 Indeed, the government's power over the Indians domi-
nated the Court's rhetoric. 147 The first case of this new period,
139. See id.
140. See id. (As a result of the Courts decision, missionaries would subsequently be sub-
ject only to any federal permission requirements before entering Indian territory).
141. See GETCHES, supra note 36, at 148
142. See id.
143. See Janice Aitken, The Trust Doctrine in Federal Indian Law: A Look at its Develop.
ment and at How its Analysis Under Social Contract Theory Might Expand its Scope, 18 N.
ILL. U. L. REV. 115, 124 (1997).
144. See Kimberly T. Ellwanger, Money Damages for Breach of the Federal-Indian Trust
Relationship After Mitchell II-United States v. Mitchell, 103 S.Ct. 2961 (1983), 59 WASH. L.
REV. 675, 675 (1984); Note, supra note 73, at 425-26 (observing that "Marshall framed the
doctrine in broad moral terms").
145. See Jeri Beth K. Ezra, Comment, The Trust Doctrine" A Source of Protection for Native
American Sacred Sites, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 705, 714 (1989).
146. See generally Blake A. Watson, The Thrust and Parry of Federal Indian Law, 23 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 437 (1998) (developing the "shield" and "sword" model of federal-Indian rela-
tional analysis).
147. See id. at 450 (discussing the difficulties of defining the Indian relationship because of
these variances).
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United States v. Kagama,148 considered the validity of a federal
statute allowing certain crimes between Indians to fall under fed-
eral, as well as tribal, jurisdiction. 149 Upholding the law, the Su-
preme Court reinvigorated Marshall's fiduciary description, de-
claring, "Indian tribes are the wards of the nation."150 The Court
supported this characterization, as had Marshall, by detailing In-
dian reliance on the government: "[The Indians] are communities
dependent on the United States-dependent largely for their daily
food; dependent for their political rights . . . From their very
weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing
of the federal government with them . . . there arises the duty of
protection, and with it power."151 With this final phrase, the Court
articulated a shift in the nation's conception of the federal/Indian
relationship. No longer would Indian dependency only inhere duty;
after Kagama, it also conferred the privileges of control and
power.152 Congress's plenary power over the Indians was born.
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcockl53 followed close on Kagama's heels. In
Lone Wolf, tribal leaders challenged the Secretary of the Interior's
violations of a treaty provision requiring approval from a tribal
majority before government disposal of Indian property. 154 Affirm-
ing the government's action as an exercise of Congress's plenary
power over the Indians, 155 the Court announced a presumption of
good faith towards Congress's dealing with the Indians. 56 In the
view of some commentators, this holding eradicated any hope of a
"judicial limit" on Congress's power over the Indians. 15 7 The gov-
ernment could break its treaty promises to the tribes if it showed a
good faith reason for the abrogation. 158 Shielded by a strong pre-
sumption of good faith, the government could now seize tribal lands
at will for distribution to land-hungry white settlers.159 Where the
148. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
149. In the case, two Indians charged with the murder of another Indian on a California
reservation challenged the statute's assignment of their case to federal law. See id.
150. Id. at 383 (emphasis added).
151. Id. at 383-84.
152. See Ezra, supra note 145, at 714-15 (explaining that the Kagama decision not only
emphasized federal dominance in Indian affairs, but also recharacterized the Indians as not
"wards," but conquered peoples).
153. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
154. Id. at 555-56.
155. See id. at 555.
156. See id. at 568.
157. See JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF MELVILLE W. FULLER, 1888-1910
161 (1995).
158. See Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 566.
159. See ELY, supra note 157, at 161.
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Cherokee Cases had recognized the independence of Indian nations
despite their reliance on the government, Kagama and Lone Wolf
derived total congressional power from the newly asserted "pure"
Indian dependency. 160
A short series of cases followed Lone Wolf, affirming congres-
sional dominance over the government's Indian wards. 161 These
cases confirmed the continuation of Indian wardship, 162 determined
that even full land ownership would not alter the special relation-
ship between the Indians and the government,163 and asserted that
the United States was both a guardian and a trustee with control of
all tribal lands. 164 In the words of the Court, Congress had a duty to
legislate, but with that duty came a positive grant of power. 16 5
C. The Fiduciary Relationship as a Constraint on Government
Power
The Kagama and Lone Wolf decisions opened a new period of
congressional dominance. As the 1900s continued, however, the
Court reconsidered the federal/Indian relationship, finding govern-
mental power as much of a constraint on legislative action as a i-
cense for dominance. 166 In the 1940s, the Court began to attribute
the responsibilities of a common law fiduciary167 to the federal gov-
ernment's Indian actions, curtailing the power Lone Wolf and Ka-
gama had conferred, and returing, once again, to a protective, Mar-
shall-esque view of the federal/Indian bond.168
160. See Aitken, supra note 143, at 118 (noting that Justice Marshall's language of Indian
dependence in Cherokee Nation "developed into the plenary power doctrine... in Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock").
161. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383 (1886); see, e.g., Morrison v. Work,
266 U.S. 481 (1925); United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591 (1916).
162. See Nice, 241 U.S. at 598 (noting that "national guardianship" would end only when
Indians were "prepared to exercise the privileges and bear the burdens of one suijuris").
163. See id. at 601 (noting that Indian wardship does not depend on allotments or trust
patents).
164. See Morrison, 266 U.S. at 485.
165. See Kagama, 118 U.S. at 383-84; GETCHES, supra note 36, at 183-84.
166. See Reid P. Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to In-
dians, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1213, reprinted in GETCHEs, supra note 36, at 240, 246-47.
167. Common law fiduciary duties are generally divided into the duty of care (the manner
in which trust responsibilities are executed) and the duty of loyalty (the obligation to act for
the best interest of the beneficiary). See supra Part I (introducing the fiduciary relationship
as an additional safeguard on the manner in which dominant parties execute their statutory
duties); see also infra Part V.B (detailing the effects of fiduciary responsibility on legal analy-
sis, particularly the allocation of the burden of proof).
168. See Chambers, supra note 166, reprinted in GETCHES, supra note 36, at 240, 246-47.
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In Seminole Nation v. United States,169 the Court held the
government to the high standards of a common law trustee in its
management of Seminole tribal funds. 170 Under its agreement with
the Indians, the government had promised annual payments to
each member of the tribe.171 At the request of tribal elders, how-
ever, it instead made the payments to the tribal council-a council
the government knew was corrupt.172 The Court applied the com-
mon law rule that the knowing utilization of a corrupt intermediate
fiduciary violates the duties of the primary fiduciary and found the
government in breach of its duty to the Indians. 173 The govern-
ment's actions had failed to meet the common law's "most exacting
fiduciary standards." 174 Effectively, the Court created a new gov-
erning principle for the federal/Indidn relationship: the government
should not act against Indian interests. 175
This pattern of judicial constraint continued over the next
forty years. In 1966, the Court of Claims adopted Seminole Nation's
high fiduciary standards in Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United
States.176 Holding the government to "exacting" common law rules,
the Claims Court found that the government's failure to inform the
Navajo tribe of a governmental sublease of its reservation oil and
gas mines violated governmental duties of care and loyalty to the
tribe. 177 Even when the government acted in the best interests of
the nation, it could not contravene the Indians' best interests. 178
The Court determined that the government, like a common law fi-
169. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286 (1942).
170. See id. at 297.
171. See id. at 295.
172. See id. at 295-96.
173. See id. at 297.
174. Id.
175. Two earlier cases had paved the way for the Seminole Nation holding. In Cramer v.
United States, 261 U.S. 219 (1923), the Court held Congress responsible for acting against
Indian interests in conveying Indian land for the development of a railroad. Similarly, in
United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 769 (1935), the Court resolved a reservation boundary
dispute in favor of the Indians, holding the U.S., as trustee, responsible for a demarcation
error. Notably, the Creek decision, while apparently holding the U.S. to a high fiduciary stan-
dard, also suggested that Congress had the power to constrain its own fiduciary duties with
specific legislation. See Chambers, supra note 166, at 242 (discussing Congress's power to
shape the scope of its trust responsibility). In Mitchell H and Nevada, the Court indirectly
clarified this notion, increasing the specificity required initially to impose fiduciary responsi-
bilities on the government, while continuing to require the government, within those respon-
sibilities, to observe the high standards of care and loyalty required of a private or common
law fiduciary. See infra Part IV.A-B.
176. Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States, 364 F.2d 320 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
177. See id at 322-24.
178. See id. at 323-24.
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duciary, had a primary duty to its beneficiaries. 7 9 The government
should have notified the tribe of the original lessee's desire to sub-
lease before seizing the opportunity for itself.180
The Northern District of California likewise applied the high
fiduciary standards imposed on common law trustees to the gov-
ernment in Manchester Band of Pomo Indians v. United States.18 l
The court held the government in violation of its fiduciary duties
for failure to invest Indian trust funds at advantageous market
rates, finding that the government's fiduciary obligations required
it to at least investigate more profitable, non-governmental invest-
ment options. 8 2
That same year, the D.C. District Court demanded higher
standards of care in a less obviously fiduciary setting.8 3 In Pyramid
Lake Pauite Tribe of Indians v. Morton, the court held that the gov-
ernment could not serve two masters without violating its trust-
based fiduciary duties. 8 4 Representing both the Indian tribe and
the opposing irrigation district in a water rights dispute, the gov-
ernment violated its duty to protect Indian interests with a high
degree of loyalty. 8 5 The government, acting as an umpire, not an
advocate, failed to meet the common law's exacting fiduciary stan-
dards. 8 6 Thus, the court found the government had failed in its du-
ties to the Indians. 8 7 The constraining responsibilities of a common
law fiduciary seemed, at least before the Supreme Court's 1982
term, firmly in place. 188
179. See id. at 324.
180. See id.
181. Manchester Band of Pomo Indians v. United States, 363 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Cal.
1973).
182. See id. at 1247.
183. See Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1973).
Pyramid Lake provides a "less obvious" fiduciary setting in that no direct trust or agency
agreement detailed the governments duties to the Indians. The government, in this case,
merely litigated on the tribe's behalf To apply fiduciary responsibility to the government's
attorney/client activities, the court considered the relevant elements of dependence, reliance,
dominance, influence, and expectations before concluding that fiduciary responsibilities should
apply. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text (explaining the three scenarios under
which a court may chose to attach fiduciary responsibilities to statutory obligations). This case
eventually led to Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983), described in the next section.
It is included here, however, as a reflection of the general understanding of the federal/Indian
relationship before the Supreme Courts 1982 term.
184. Pyramid Lake, 354 F. Supp. at 256-57.
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. See id.
188. See, e.g,. United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980) (removing the presump-
tion of good faith on the part of Congress expressed in Lone Wolf and finding greater duties in
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D. The Resulting Relationship: A Common Law Fiduciary?
By the beginning of the 1980s, a rough outline of fed-
eral/Indian law had taken a discernible, if shadowy, shape.18 9 First
elucidated as a protective power by Marshall's Cherokee Cases,90
the federal government's plenary control over Indian affairs had
developed into a positive assertion of federal dominance. 191 This
control, however, was not unlimited. The complementary duties of
care and loyalty restrained the government fiduciary. 92
Although the courts frequently held the government to com-
mon law fiduciary standards, the imprecision of the common law
analogy strained such applications. Marshall, comparing the gov-
ernment to a guardian, failed to note a statutory or regulatory
source from which this duty might arise. 193 Common law, however,
required a specific manifestation to precede imposition of fiduciary
responsibility. 194 Furthermore, even within the common law, the
roles of guardians and wards were unclear. Felix Cohen, writing on
Indian law in the 1920s, explored at least ten possible common law
definitions for "ward" that could apply to the federal/Indian
context. 9 5 "Ward" could refer to a domestic dependent nation.196
"Ward" could also refer to obedience to congressional power. 197 For
cases where Congress is a specifically designated trustee); Joint Tribal Council of Passama-
quoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370, 377 (lst Cir. 1975) (recognizing that the unique rela-
tionship between tribe and government applies to all Indians, even those not formally recog-
nized by the government, unless Congress specifically provides otherwise); see also GETCHES,
supra note 36, at 135.
189. But see Chambers, supra note 166, at 246 (suggesting that any coherence must be
"forced" onto Indian trust law).
190. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31
U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
191. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,
187 U.S. 553, 555, 568 (1903).
192. See supra Part III.C (describing Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297
(1942), Pyramid Lake, 354 F. Supp. at 256, and Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States, 364
F.2d 320, 322 (Ct. Cl. 1966)).
193. See GETCHES, supra note 36, at 424
194. See Note, supra note 73, at 423 (observing that "the development of a coherent trust
doctrine must begin with an analysis of the relevant precepts of morality that permeate
American law.").
195. See COHEN, supra note 29, at 169-73. The Department of Interior later adopted these
definitions in its discussion of Federal Indian Law. See FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 29,
at 557-66. Because Cohen first articulated these standards, this Note will primarily reference
his works.
196. See COHEN, supra note 29, at 170. This definition supports Marshall's use of the term
in the Cherokee Cases to distinguish the Indians from foreign states. See Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
197. See COHEN, supra note 29, at 170-71.
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the Indians, Congress's plenary powers extended even beyond the
scope of its normal legislative authority. 198 "Ward" could also reflect
Congress's power over an individual.199 In the case of individual In-
dians, such power derived from tribal legislation.200 At common law,
a "ward" could be a person subject to the jurisdiction of federal
courts20 1 or to administrative power.20 2 A "ward" could also be a
simple trust beneficiary. 20 3 "Ward" could refer to a noncitizen,2 4 or
the recipient of the "federal bounty. °20 5 A "ward" could be any per-
son holding land subject to restraints on alienation 20 6 or a person
with unequal bargaining power.20 7 While no single definition fully
encapsulated the federal/Indian relationship, the range of possibili-
ties demonstrated the ambiguities within Marshall's original char-
acterization.
To further complicate matters, the government also eluded
the neat definition of a common law guardian. At common law, a
guardian has physical custody of the ward, and normally decides
where the ward will live.2 08 The guardian uses the ward's own funds
to secure the beneficiary's education and personal maintenance. 209
The guardian manages the ward's property for the ward's benefit,
refrains from profiting at the ward's expense, and provides an ac-
198. See FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 29, at 561. In this context, "ward" served a very
different purpose from the common law term. Rather than being used by dependents to de-
mand care, under Kagama's plenary power model, the term justified extension of the fiduciary
government's dominance. See id.
199. See COHEN, supra note 29, at 171.
200. See id.
201. See id. This definition provides little guidance for fiduciary applications.
202. See id. at 171-72. Applying this definition to the Indians would not place them in a
fiduciary relationship with the administrating agency, i.e. the BIA. While the agency man-
ages Indian affairs for the government, it does not directly manage the affairs of the tribe. See
FEDERAL INDIAN LAw, supra note 29, at 563 n.1. Thus, the "administrative power" to which
the Indian ward acquiesces is the federal government.
203. See COHEN, supra note 29, at 172. This definition cannot fully describe the fed-
eral/Indian relationship because Congress and the courts have determined that an Indian
remains a ward of the federal government even when the government does not hold property
or funds in trust for the Indian. See FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 29, at 564.
204. See COHEN, supra note 29, at 564. The 1924 Indian Citizenship Act recognized Indi-
ans as citizens. See Indian Citizenship Act, 43 Stat. 253 (1924), reprinted in DOCUMENTS,
supra note 68, at 218. The "noncitizen" definition, therefore, does not apply to modern Indians.
205. See COHEN, supra note 29, at 173.
206. See id. at 172. This is problematic in reference to Indians because the Indian rela-
tionship with the government does not end if existing restraints are lifted. See supra note 163
and accompanying text.
207. See COHEN, supra note 29, at 172-73.
208. See FEDERAL INDIAN LAw, supra note 29, at 557.
209. See id.
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counting of the estate when the guardianship ends. 210 Although the
government arguably had some physical control over Indians211 and
maintained extensive control over individual and tribal property
and funds, its responsibility to refrain from self-interested profit
and to provide a thorough accounting of resources remained, in
light of historical governmental behavior, in question.2 12 After over
a hundred years of Indian litigation and legislation, the precise na-
ture of the government/Indian fiduciary relationship remained in
flux.
E. Canons of Construction
Despite these ambiguities, courts intuited that the fed-
eral/Indian relationship was special. 213 Several canons of construc-
tion crucial to court assessments of Indian claims developed to re-
flect the relationship's fiduciary bond.214 The basic rules arose from
treaty interpretation: treaties should be construed to favor the In-
dians, any ambiguities must be resolved in favor of the Indians or
as the Indians would have understood them, and Congress must
show clear intent to break a treaty.215 These provisions, both in
treaties and later in non-treaty agreements and statutes, 216 pro-
tected the weaker-positioned Indian bargainer. 217 In non-treaty
210. See id.
211. The government, for instance, confined Indians to reservations with aggressive treaty
provisions. See supra Part II.A.
212. See Cobell v. Babbitt, 37 F. Supp. 2d 6, 9 (D.D.C. 1999) (holding the government in
contempt for failure to provide requested documentation of Indian trust accounts); see also
supra Part II.A (chronicling the changing policies and contrary attitudes with which the gov-
ernment has addressed Indian interests over the past two centuries).
213. See Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296 (1942). The "special" nature
of the federal/Indian relationship has proved, for the Indians, both a blessing and a curse.
Where in Seminole Nation, it increased the governments protection of Indian interests, in
Kagama and Lone Wolf, it enlarged Congress's power to modify those same interests. See su-
pra Part I. B-C (discussing the shift in policy from Kagama's plenary power interpretation to
Seminole Nation's restraint on congressional action). The canons of construction emphasize
the more protective side of the "special" relationship, ensuring protections above the basic
statutory responsibilities, indirectly requiring a nearly fiduciary duty of care.
214. See Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Ab-
rogation: 'As Long as Water Flows, or Grass Grows Green Upon the Earth"--How Long a Time
is That?, 63 CAL. L. REV. 601, 617 (1975) ('The unequal bargaining position of the tribes and
the recognition of the trust relationship have led to the development of canons of construction
designed to rectify the inequality.").
215. See Ralph W. Johnson & Berrie Martinis, Chief Justice Rehnquist and the Indian
Cases, 16 PuB. LAND L. REV. 1, 1 (1995).
216. See id.
217. See Thomas H. Pacheco, Indian Bedlands Claims: A Need to Clear the Waters, 15
HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1991).
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agreements, the canons required liberal construction in the deter-
mination of an Indian right, strict construction of statutes abridg-
ing those rights, and express congressional intent to constrain In-
dian privileges through passage of a general law.2 18
These rules, structured around the courts' understanding of
the federal/Indian relationship, reflected the centrality of that re-
lationship in Indian law.219 Their potentially decisive effect reem-
phasized the importance of the federal/Indian fiduciary bond.22 0
While the precise confines of the fiduciary relationship eluded easy
definition,221 the strength of the government's duty to the Indians
shone clear. The underlying federal/Indian relationship, as ex-
pressed in the canons of construction, affected the manner in which
the government performed all its Indian-related duties, from man-
aging money,2 22 to land management, 223 to keeping, or breaking, its
word.2 24 Just as the Supreme Court identified power in the fed-
eral/Indian relationship, 2 5 the evolved canons of construction re-
flected an equally "awesome" moral and political duty, existing out-
side any particular interaction, to protect Indian interests. 226
IV. THE MODERN INTERPRETATION: LIMITED FIDUCIARY
DUTY UNDER MITCHELL 11 AND NEVADA
By the start of the 1980s, the federal/Indian relationship had
taken reasonably definite shape. Although the specific contours of
governmental responsibility remained elusive, the special nature of
the federal/Indian relationship continued to mold Indian law.22 7 Ac-
knowledging the importance of this fiduciary bond, courts applied
218. See GETCHES, supra note 36, at 201, 203-04.
219. See id. at 204.
220. See Pacheo, supra note 218, at 6; see also supra note 214 (highlighting the emphasis
the canons of construction placed on the protective aspect of the federal/Indian relationship
and their foreshadowing of later impositions of common law fiduciary standards on govern-
ment actions towards the Indians).
221. See supra Part I (attempting a preliminary definition of the functions of fiduciary
law).
222. See Manchester Band of Pomo Indians v. United States, 363 F. Supp. 1238, 1242
(N.D. Cal. 1973).
223. See Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States, 364 F.2d 320, 322 (1966).
224. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 555-56 (1903).
225. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886).
226. See GETCHES, supra note 36, at 248.
227. See United States v. Mitchell ("Mitchell II'), 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983) (noting the "un-
disputed existence of a general trust relationship" between the government and the Indians);
see also supra Part II.A-C (explaining the evolution of the courts' characterization of the gov-
ernments fiduciary role).
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strict common law duties 228 to cases of government mismanage-
ment, particularly in the handling of formal trusts.229 During its
1982 term, however, the Supreme Court decided two cases that re-
shaped federal/Indian law, requiring identification of specific crite-
ria before application of common law fiduciary obligations 230 and de-
emphasizing the duty of loyalty when the government's duty to the
Indians conflicted with the multitude of other governmental re-
sponsibilities. 231
A. Mitchell II: The Control Principle
In United States v. Mitchell ("Mitchell IF'), the Quinault and
Quileute tribes of Washington state claimed monetary damages for
the government's mismanagement of forest resources. 232 The tribes
first ceded land to the government in the late 1800s, exchanging
their territory for the creation of a reservation and a promise of
protection from expanding settlements. 233 A few years later, the
GAA divided the reservation lands for individual distribution. 23 4 By
1935, although the government had allotted all of the 2,340 identi-
fied parcels, it retained nearly two-thirds of those plots in trust.23 5
Additionally, as part of its trust duties, the government undertook
management of the reservation's vast forest resources. 236
In their claim, first filed in 1971, the reservation Indians al-
leged mismanagement of the trust lands, including failure to pay
interest during some quarters, failure to pay interest at a reason-
able rate during others, failure to compute annual maintenance ex-
penses, failure to perform adequate maintenance including the fail-
ure to build necessary logging roads, and sale of tribal lands at less
228. See supra Part I (discussing the premises of private or "common law" fiduciary duties
as attached to specific statutory responsibilities).
229. See supra note 183 and accompanying text (explaining the difference between "obvi-
ous" fiduciary settings, in which statutes impose a recognized fiduciary relationship, and "less
obvious" fiduciary settings in which the Indians must show, by purpose or circumstance, the
existence of a fiduciary bond).
230. See Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 219, 220 (outlining specific statutory provisions that de-
fined the parameters of the governmenfs obligations to the Indians regarding timber sales
from reservation lands); see also infra notes 258-60 and accompanying text.
231. See Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 135 n.15; see also infra notes 302-05 and
accompanying text.
232. See Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 210.
233. See id. at 208.
234. See id. at 209.
235. See id.
236. See id.
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than fair market value.23 7 The Court of Claims238 accepted jurisdic-
tion, asserting that the GAA created a fiduciary relationship be-
tween the government and the Indians, which empowered the Indi-
ans to challenge governmental breaches of fiduciary duties. 239 The
Supreme Court, however, first hearing the case in 1980,240 rejected
the Claims Court's decision, finding that the GAA created only a
general trust relationship from which the Court could impose no
positive duties for monetary damage purposes.241 The Court re-
manded, requesting identification of more particularized standards
that could support specific fiduciary duties. 42 The Claims Court
reevaluated the case, this time identifying a series of specific stat-
utes on timber sales and forest management as potential sources
for a more concrete fiduciary responsibility.24 On Mitchell's second
appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court approved the proposed
statutes as sufficiently specific to beget fiduciary duties supporting
237. See id. at 210.
238. Congress had, before 1946, passed legislation to waive sovereignty for individual In-
dians to sue the government. Although the Court of Claims had, since 1855, heard other
claims against the government, Indians were specifically excluded from use of its courtroom.
The Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946, 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 70-70v, established a special com-
mission to hear existing Indian claims and provided for the litigation of subsequent cases in
the Court of Claims. While most cases centered on land disputes, the Claims Court had juris-
diction in law and equity over constitutional, treaty or tort based claims. The Claims Court,
however, could provide only monetary damage remedies. See Sandra C. Danforth, The Indian
Claims Commission, 49 N.D. L. REV. 359, reprinted in GETCHES, supra note 36, at 152-55.
239. See Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 210.
240. See United States v. Mitchell ('Mitchell 1"), 445 U.S. 535 (1980).
241. See id. at 544-46. Importantly, the Mitchell I and Mitchell H decisions both focused on
the ability of the Indians to claim monetary damages in response to the alleged breach of
trust. Under the Indian Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §§1491, 1505, Indians may bring suit against
the government in the Court of Claims only with government consent. See Mitchell , 463
U.S. at 212. To waive the consent requirements of the Tucker Act, the court must find statu-
tory authority providing a specific requirement of fiduciary duty. The purpose of the act, to
assure Indians a "fair day in court," and thereby to ensure agency accountability, is, in Con-
gress's view, preserved by the consent or specificity requirement, assuring Indians will pursue
only valid claims against the government. See id. at 214, 216-17. In Mitchell I and Mitchell
II, the Indians sought monetary damages claiming that equitable remedies, retrievable out-
side the Tucker Act restrictions, were inappropriate. See id. at 227. Because of the difficulties
of monitoring the government, because a trusteeship generally does not require beneficiary
monitoring, and because the risk of damage before discovery of mismanagement was great in
the forest management situation, the Indians sought monetary compensation rather than
equitable remedies for the alleged government omissions. See id. In cases based on a statu-
tory claim in which Indian plaintiffs do not seek monetary damages, courts may waive sover-
eignty under the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 701, which forbids courts
to dismiss non-monetary claims alleging harm from the official action or inaction of a govern-
ment agent. See, e.g., Cobell v. Babbitt, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1, 24-25 (D.D.C. 1999).
242. See Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 211.
243. See id. at 220.
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monetary damages. 2 " The Court noted, however, that the fiduciary
relationship appeared not only in the specific statutory provisions
from which the plaintiffs now tried to define the government's trust
responsibilities, but also in the more general relationship that the
government's comprehensive control of the forest lands had
created.245 In the words of the Court, "a fiduciary relationship nec-
essarily arises when the Government assumes ... elaborate control
over forests and property belonging to Indians."246 Continuing, the
Court explained that "[all] of the necessary elements of a common-
law trust [were] present: a trustee (the United States), a benefici-
ary (the Indian allottees), and a trust corpus (Indian timber, lands,
and funds)."247 The sources of the government's obligations were
not, however, limited to the terms of statutes or the extent of its
immediate control. 248 Underlying the government's statutory and
control-based responsibilities, the Court recognized the "undisputed
existence of a general trust relationship between the United States
and the Indian people,"249 which comprised a "distinctive obligation
of trust incumbent upon the Government" in Indian affairs.250
Justice Powell, with Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor join-
ing, dissented from the majority's decision, asserting that by evalu-
ating the sufficiency of the offered statutes, the Court usurped Con-
gress's duty to establish a basis for claims against the
government.251 The dissent also objected to the majority's references
to the rules of common law trusts.2 2 It argued that the relevant
agreements must include the term "trustee" before the Court could
attach such strict fiduciary standards to the government's respon-
sibilities. 253 Because of the government's inherent differences from
a common law benefactor, common law standards would not apply
244. Id. at 224-26.
245. See id. at 225.
246. Id.
247. Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 210.
248. See supra Part I.
249. Mitchell I, 463 U.S. at 210 (noting the importance of comprehensive control in rais-
ing the level of governmental responsibility, and suggesting a new standard, based on that
control, for Indian claim analysis).
250. Id. (citing Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296 (1942)). The Court
also suggested the potential extension of its reasoning to government management of Indian
funds. See id.
251. See id. at 229-30 (Powell, J., dissenting). The dissent continued its critique, suggest-
ing that by allowing the Court to establish bases for claims in Indian suits only, the Court
provided the Indians a benefit denied to other litigants. Furthermore, the dissent denied the
right of the Court to impose trust duties against the government unless unambiguously as-
serted in the language of the governing statutes. See id. at 233 (Powell, J., dissenting).
252. See id. at 233-34 (Powell, J., dissenting).
253. See id. at 234 (Powell, J., dissenting).
2000] 1665
1666 VANDERBILTLAWREVIEW [Vol. 53:5:1637
generally. 254 The dissent believed the majority had turned the fed-
eral/Indian relationship from a protective shield to an Indian
sword. 255
Mitchell II offered a variety of new interpretations of the fed-
eral/Indian relationship. First, it announced a new, control-based
theory of government responsibility.256 As the dissent protested,25 7
no longer would only the magic term "trustee" invite application of
common law fiduciary standards. 258 Instead, a contextual analysis
of the parties' situations would either confirm or, in a few cases,
negate the underlying recognition of a general federal/Indian fidu-
ciary relationship. 259 This new control analysis reinforced previous
statutory assignments of responsibility260 and embodied the ideas of
inequality and government supremacy imbedded in the long-
accepted canons of Indian construction. 261 Confusion arose, how-
ever, as to how the new control standard should and would find ap-
plication.262
254. See id. at 234 n.8 (explaining the various differences between the government trustee
and a common law trustee, including the lack of a manifestation of intent to take on the trus-
teeship, and the ambiguity of prior Court analyses of the relationship that characterized the
government as both guardian and trustee) (Powell, J., dissenting); see also supra Part III.D.
255. See id. at 234-35 (Powell, J., dissenting). Interestingly, the dissent uses the
shield/sword imagery here in opposition to its original post-Kagama use. Where previously
the image denoted an aggressive use of the fiduciary relationship by Congress to justify in-
creasing encroachment into Indian territory, the Mitchell HI dissent uses the "sword" image to
explain what it characterizes as an unduly broad assertion of Indian protective rights.
256. See Russell Lawrence Barsh, Is There Any Indian "Law" Left? A Review of the Su-
preme Court's 1982 Term, 59 WASH. L. REV. 863, 885 (1984).
257. See Mitchell .1, 463 U.S. at 234.
258. See Barsh, supra note 256, at 885.
259. See generally Aitken, supra note 143, at 116.
260. See Mitchell IT, 463 U.S. at 219-22, 224 (detailing the statutes listing specific duties to
which fiduciary responsibility might attach, including the IRA and the timber management
statutes, 25 U.S.C. §§ 406-07, 466, and noting that these provisions, "clearly give the Federal
Government full responsibility to manage Indian resources and land for the benefit of the
Indians"). By reemphasizing federal duty where the Court found pervasive control, the court
broadened the effect of these responsibilities, potentially creating an additional ring of respon-
sibility to which fiduciary duties, already recognized as attaching to statutorily defined obliga-
tions might de facto apply. See supra Part L.A (describing the various circumstances under
which fiduciary duties may attach to statutory, de facto, or circumstantial responsibilities).
261. See Ellwanger, supra note 144, at 684. The canons demonstrated that because of the
government's bargaining supremacy and expansive control potential, the courts would gener-
ously interpret statutes for Indian benefit when confusion or ambiguity arose. See supra Part
III.E (describing the Indian canons of construction). The new control standard similarly rec-
ognized this potential for the government, even within statutory guidelines, to accumulate
enough power over the Indians to facilitate abuse. Thus, the control test brought an addi-
tional area of government dominance to the court's scrutiny, acting, like the canons, to ensure
the Indians the full benefit of legislation designed on their behalf. See supra notes 248-49 and
accompanying text (describing the control test).
262. See Barsh, supra note 256, at 886.
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These uncertainties spawned several competing analyses of
the Mitchell H decision. One theory envisioned the control require-
ment as a rejection of the full application of common law trust doc-
trine. 263 Giving courts a flexible standard under which to assess the
applicability of common law standards, the Court, according to this
line of reasoning, indirectly reasserted its control of the fed-
erallIndian relationship. 264 This theory, however, failed to integrate
the idea behind the dissent's objections, that the Court had shifted
power from the government to the Indians.265 A second group of
theories debated which of the Mitchell 1I factors necessitated the
imposition of common law responsibilities: control, pervasive con-
trol, the presence of common law trust elements, statutory lan-
guage, or a combination of all of these. 266 Further questions arose as
to whether the federal/Indian relationship now justified a presump-
tion of common law fiduciary obligation anytime the government
acted in Indian affairs.267 While "logic and fairness" 268 urged in-
creasing governmental responsibility, the words of the Court left
the requirement of such an increase less certain.269 The small dif-
ferences between the unacceptable provisions of the GAA offered in
Mitchell I and the responsibility-assigning passages examined in
Mitchell II, if construed narrowly, supported a very strict standard
for assessing comprehensive control.270 Applied more broadly, how-
ever, in conjunction with the Court's recognition of a pre-existing
federal/Indian relationship, the decision facilitated the application
263. See id.
264. See id.
265. See Mitchell H, 463 U.S. at 234-35.
266. See Aitken, supra note 143, at 136-37. Additional criticism, following the dissents
objections, highlighted the inconsistencies between the federal/Indian relationship and the
common law fiduciary model, arguing that common law duties should never apply to the gov-
ernment. See Ellwanger, supra note 144, at 689.
267. See Michael Roy, Note, Indians May Sue for Breach of Federal Trust Relationship:
United States v. Mitchell, 26 B.C. L. REV. 809, 840 (1985).
268. Ellwanger, supra note 144, at 686. Ellwanger argues that an examination of the op-
posite conclusion justified an assumption of intent to increase government responsibility. If
the government was not held to a high standard when it controlled Indian activity, she ex-
plains, it would gain unlimited authority with only limited potential accountability. In the
face of a history of abuse and oppression, such allowances seemed unlikely to reflect congres-
sional intent. See id. at 686-87.
269. See id. at 686 (observing that absent a specific statutory scheme, a court might be
unwilling to hold the government liable for money damages based on a breach of trust).
270. See Aitken, supra note 143, at 136-37. Because, in Mitchell II, the government had
nearly complete control of the Indian lands and funds in question, later courts could construe
the holding as requiring the same type of nation-wide, historically based dominance to justify
attaching the Mitchell II specificity and control principles.
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of higher standards on almost all Indian claims.271 While the first
approach risked excluding relevant claims against the government,
the second potentially neglected case-specific incidents of Indian
control.27 2 Fortunately, a second case, Nevada v. United States, 273
decided three days before Mitchell II, clarified the Court's intended
analysis.
B. Nevada v. United States: Accepting Divided Loyalties
Nevada v. United States represented the culmination of the
1970s Pyramid Lake dispute. 274 In 1859, the government created a
half million acre reservation for the Paiute Indians along the banks
of Pyramid Lake, a vast desert lake, originally over fifty miles long
and twelve miles wide.275 Forty years later, the government re-
claimed much of the reserved land for irrigation projects, giving
nearly 200,000 acres to the Newlands Irrigation District.276 The
government's action gave water rights on the Truckee River, the
sole source of water for Pyramid Lake, to three classes of people:
private owners of riverside property, the reservation Indians (rep-
resented by the government), and the Irrigation District (also rep-
resented by the government).27 7 Concerns about water allocation,
raised in 1913, settled initially in 1944.278 The government returned
the controversy to the courts in 1973, however, seeking additional
water rights for the Indians.27 9 Since the establishment of the res-
ervation, Pyramid Lake had receded by 20,000 acres. 280 The gov-
ernment, on behalf of the Indians, claimed the 1944 settlement's
allocation addressed only the Indians' irrigation needs, neglecting
the importance of lake levels to their fishing-based economy. 281 The
Court decided the earlier settlement precluded the current claim.282
271. See id. Alternatively, because the government realistically exercises at least some
control in almost every aspect of tribal Indian life, from housing, health care and education, to
land and resource management, subsequent decisions could use Mitchell II as an opening for
suit on almost any aspect of this widespread federal control.
272. See id.
273. Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983).
274. See supra Part III.C.
275. See Nevada, 463 U.S. at 115.
276. See id.
277. See id. at 116-17.
278. See id. at 113.
279. See id.
280. See id. at 115.
281. See id. at 118-19.
282. See id. at 143.
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The majority's discussion of the government's dual representation
of the Indians and the opposing Irrigation District, however, refined
the modern understanding of governmental fiduciary responsibili-
ties. 283
The Court cited Seminole Nation's declarations of the gov-
ernment's unique duties to the Indians.2 4 It noted, however, the
key difference between governmental and private duties of
loyalty:28 5 where a common law trustee must act only for the inter-
ests of a single beneficiary, the government may wear "two hats"
when Congress so requires. 28 6 The Court could not, recognizing this
structural difference between government and private trustees, im-
pose private fiduciary law unquestioningly on the federal/Indian
relationship. 28 7 The breadth of governmental responsibility, how-
ever, could not excuse the neglect of federal obligations to the Indi-
ans.288 While government inherently involved divided responsibil-
ity, the court should not allow the division to jeopardize the Indi-
ans' fiduciary interest. 28 9
In significant dicta, the Court commented that the "United
States undoubtedly owes a strong fiduciary duty to its Indian
wards."290 Continuing, the Court suggested that when Congress has
not imposed additional, conflicting responsibilities upon it, the gov-
ernment should uphold the same standards as a common law fidu-
ciary.291 Emphasizing this reasoning, the Brennan concurrence ac-
283. See id. at 127.
284. See id.
285. See id. at 128.
286. See id. at 135-38 n.15.
287. See id. at 141.
288. See id. at 142.
289. See id.
290. Id.
291. See id. While the Court did not explicitly discuss the appropriate standard for inter-
actions in which Congress did give the government a conflicting responsibility, history and
precedent support two possible interpretations. First, under Nevada, the Court recognized
that the government may divide its attentions. See id. at 135-38 n. 13. At common law, fiduci-
ary obligations require the interests of the beneficiary to be the fiduciary's sole priority. See
Finn, Principle, supra note 8, at 4. If more than one beneficiary exists for a single interaction,
the fiduciary must treat both parties with equally high observations of care and loyalty. See
FINN, OBLIGATIONS, supra note 5, at 45-46. Thus, the Coures exception could simply provide
an opening for the government to take on additional responsibilities, while still requiring that
it treat the Indians, and the additional beneficiaries, within a single, common law type fiduci-
ary obligation. See infra notes 292-95 and accompanying text (discussing the Brennan concur-
rence's admonition that the government could only divide responsibility if Indian interests
would not be jeopardized). In Nevada, however, the Court acted to create an exception from a
general rule of fiduciary responsibility. See infra notes 300-03 and accompanying text. A
more tenable analysis, therefore, assumes that the government, when faced with conflicting
responsibilities, must observe not the private standard applied to a fiduciary with multiple
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cepted the government's ability to act for two masters, but asserted
the government's continued duty to act for the Indians.292 Should
the government's divided attentions cause harm to the Indians,
Brennan observed, the courts should hold the government responsi-
ble.293 Only so long as the government adequately served the Indi-
ans could Congress justifiably divide governmental loyalty.294
The Nevada decision sparked two lines of interpretation. It
appeared "pro-Indian" in its emphasis of common law fiduciary du-
ties in the federal/Indian context. The Court allowed a limited ex-
ception from those duties only when Congress specifically required
representation of an opposing interest, highlighting the general ap-
plicability of common fiduciary law.295 Courts would presumably set
a high standard for the justification of such divided interests. 296 Al-
ternatively, the decision appeared "pro-government," providing
broad leeway for acting against Indian interests under the loose
"nature of government" rationale. 297 Under either view, however,
two clear principles emerged. First, in recognizing the same "gen-
eral" fiduciary duty mentioned in Mitchell II, the Court reinforced
the notion of a pre-existing duty.298 Second, while finding that in
the case at bar Congress required the government to represent the
conflicting interests of the Indians and the Irrigation District, the
Court recognized this scenario as an exception from the general ap-
plicability of common law fiduciary standards.299 Nevada thus af-
benefactors, but a modified, lower standard of loyalty and care. The government would treat
the beneficiaries of all of its mandated attentions not as multiple parties to the same obliga-
tion, but as parties to individual relationships, each owed a different level of responsibility.
Under this, more likely, analysis, Indian interests appear less secure. Since the Cherokee
Cases, the "unique" relationship between the government and the Indians has imposed greatly
varied levels of care on the government. See supra Part III.A-C (describing the progression of
Court interpretations of the federal/Indian relationship). Where Seminole Nation saw the
relationship as reasserting governmental duty, see supra Part III.C, Kagama and Lone Wolf
used it to empower Congress to more broadly control its Indian beneficiaries, see supra Part
III.B. Hence, in Nevada's second category of federal/Indian interaction, that in which Con-
gress has divided the governments attentions, the Court thrusts the Indians back to their
indeterminate, pre-Mitchell II state. While Mitchell II's requirements of specific statutory
duties remain, see supra Part IV.A, the care with which those duties must be executed ap-
pears, within this category, likely to fall short of the common law's "exacting" fiduciary stan-
dards of loyalty and care.
292. See Nevada, 463 U.S. at 145 (Brennan, J., concurring).
293. See id.
294. See id.
295. See Aitken, supra note 143, at 140.
296. See id. at 141.
297. Barsh, supra note 256, at 889.
298. See Nevada, 463 U.S. at 142.
299. See id.
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firmed Mitchell ITs assertion that common law fiduciary standards,
based not only on the specific statutory and control situation before
the court, but also on the underlying fiduciary relationship between
the government and the Indians, should apply to Indian claims un-
less the Nevada exception applied.300
Together, Mitchell 11 and Nevada heralded a new era of case-
specific Indian law.301 The appropriateness of common law fiduciary
standards required case-by-case analysis, but the recognition of a
pervasive, underlying fiduciary bond would color that considera-
tion.302 Although the Court confirmed the restraining quality of the
fiduciary relationship, 30 3 the "exclusive loyalty" of the government
would depend on the applicability of Nevada's exceptional circum-
stances.304 To hold the government to the high standards of a com-
mon law fiduciary in its exercise of statutory or control-based duties
to the Indians, Indian plaintiffs now had to prove two elements:
1) that the right affected fell within statutory or control-based gov-
ernmental responsibilities, 30 5 and 2) that no conflicting congres-
sional mandates divided loyalties, precluding the application of
common law standards. 30 6 Although both Mitchell 11 and Nevada
recognized the importance of acknowledging an underlying fiduci-
ary bond beyond the specific provisions of any single interaction,
courts did not effectuate this recognition in allocating the proce-
dural burden of establishing that the government owed the Indians
common law fiduciary duties in a particular instance.
C. The Post-Mitchell I/ Nevada cases
Interpretations of the Mitchell H and Nevada decisions ap-
peared not only in theoretical analyses, but also in the language of
subsequent decisions. Exploring the use of the Mitchell H and Ne-
vada precedents in a series of later cases reveals that while control
and dual responsibility helped shape the extent of the government's
fiduciary responsibilities, the acceptance of a pervasive, underlying
federal/Indian fiduciary bond remained strong.
In a 1986 rehearing en banc, the Tenth Circuit adopted its
original dissent to affirm Mitchell ITs control principles. The case,
300. See Barsh, supra note 256, at 886.
301. See id. at 864.
302. See id. at 887.
303. See Aitken, supra note 143, at 142.
304. See id. at 141.
305. See United States v. Mitchell ("Mitchell I"), 463 U.S. 206, 219-22 (1983).
306. See Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 142 (1983).
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Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corporation,30 7 involved an
Indian tribe's claim for federal mismanagement of gas leases on
reservation lands.808 In assessing governmental responsibility, the
court cited Mitchell II to support the existence of an "all pervasive
'general trust relationship' " as well as the "context-specific trust
relationship"309 it found in statutory language and congressional
intent.3 10 Viewing these two types of relationships in light of the
pervasive role of the Department of the Interior in Indian mineral
and resource management, the court found the government had ex-
hibited a "firm desire" to act as trustee for the Indian mines. 31'
Such trusteeship placed significant fiduciary constraints on the
Secretary's management discretion.3 12 Mitchell II, according to the
Tenth Circuit, had raised the standards of care and loyalty for fed-
eral administration of Indian affairs. Mitchell H obligated the gov-
ernment, under the same fiduciary duties as a common law trustee,
to pursue the action in the Indians' best interest.3 13 Additionally,
the court reasserted the viability of the canons of Indian construc-
tion, stating a need to construe any statutory ambiguity in favor of
greater governmental responsibility.3 14
As in Mitchell 11 itself, the Jicarilla dissent further clarified
the position of the majority. The overturned judge protested the
court's en banc interpretation of Mitchell II, claiming that Mitchell
11 in fact revoked the idea of an underlying fiduciary duty, requir-
ing instead a purely statutory construction of the federal/Indian
fiduciary relationship. 315 The dissent viewed Nevada as a final re-
jection of common law fiduciary standards for governmental trus-
tees.3 16
Despite the dissent's objections, the Jicarilla majority's in-
terpretation quickly prevailed. In 1987, the Federal Circuit, in
Pawnee v. United States,317 reviewed an Indian class action alleging
307. Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp., 728 F.2d 855 (10th Cir. 1986) (adopt-
ing, en banc, Judge Seymour's dissent in Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp., 728
F.2d 1555, 1563-73 (10th Cir. 1984)). Citations will appear in original Seymour dissent.
308. See id. at 1557-58.
309. Id. at 1563.
310. See id. at 1564 (noting the relative unimportance of specific language in revealing
Congress's intent to take on fiduciary obligations).
311. See id. at 1564-65.
312. See id. at 1567.
313. See id.
314. See id.
315. See Jicarilla, 782 F.2d at 858.
316. See id. at 859-60.
317. Pawnee v. United States, 830 F.2d 187 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
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violation of the government's fiduciary duties in the management of
oil and gas leases.318 The court identified a general fiduciary rela-
tionship between the Indians and the federal government, repre-
sented before the Court by the Department of the Interior.319 Within
this general relationship, the court found that it could presume a
more particular fiduciary relationship for certain types of interac-
tions under the Mitchell II guidelines. 320 According to the Federal
Circuit, while Mitchell II relied on particular statutory provisions
to impose common law fiduciary standards on the government, Ji-
carilla Apache had already demonstrated the viability of a breach of
fiduciary duty claim in the area of gas and oil leasing; thus, in
claims within this realm of interaction, the court could presume
sufficient statutory precision to justify a claim. 321 While statutory
language continued to confine the extent of the government's du-
ties, the Court could assume the existence of such duties in a previ-
ously examined area of federallIndian affairs.3 22
The Court of Claims considering an Indian claim for breach of
trust over a loss of water rights litigation in which the United
States had represented the Indians, interpreted Mitchell II in
1991.323 Resolving the case, Fort Mojave Indian Tribe v. United
States, 324 the Claims Court followed Mitchell 11, requiring specific
statutory guidelines in the establishment of substantive trust re-
sponsibilities. 325 Finding a sufficient statutory framework, the court
then looked to private trust law to define the government's fiduci-
ary responsibilities. 326 The court explained that Mitchell II had
raised the standards for government fiduciaries. When the govern-
ment acted on behalf of its Indian beneficiaries, it would have to act
318. See id. at 188.
319. See id. at 189-90.
320. See id. at 190 (discussing the presumption of a specific trust relationship in the man-
agement of Indian oil and gas leases).
321. See id. at 189-90. This type of assumption, over time, created the automatic imposi-
tion of fiduciary duties in many common law fiduciary relationships. See supra notes 12-17
and accompanying text.
322. See Jicarilla, 728 F.2d at 191-92. In asserting its "assumption" principle, the court
added a warning that although it would presume duty in a specific area of Indian affairs, each
Indian claimant would have to prove a valid violation of that duty at trial. See id.
323. See Fort Mojave Indian Tribe v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 417 (Cl. Ct. 1991). The case
also involved a Fifth Amendment takings claim beyond the scope of this Note.
324. Id.
325. See id. at 424. The court asserted, for instance, that the GAA lacked the specificity
required to create an enforceable fiduciary relationship, restricting its function to the preven-
tion of state taxation on Indian lands. See id. (quoting United States v. Mitchell ("Mitchell 1"),
445 U.S. 535, 544 (1980)).
326. See id. at 426.
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like a common law fiduciary, as the "reasonably prudent man" pro-
tecting his own property.327
The District Court for the District of Columbia undertook the
most recent examination of Mitchell 11 and Nevada in Cobell v.
Babbitt.3 28 In 1996, the court certified a class of over 300,000 Native
Americans claiming mismanagement of trust funds against the De-
partments of the Interior and Treasury. 29 While the plaintiffs in
the case, unlike the Indians in Mitchell II, sought only equitable
relief,33 0 the dispute drew national attention to the still unbalanced
relationship between Indians and the federal government.33 1
The plaintiff Indians raised claims for breach of both common
law and statutory trust duties.3 32 The court, on an issue of first im-
pression,333 rejected the Indians' common law claim, asserting that
common law alone provided an insufficient basis for the alleged
breach of the Individual Indian Monetary Account ("JIM") trust du-
ties.33 4 Although the court confidently determined that history dem-
onstrated the existence of a federal/Indian relationship built on de-
pendency and trust, it believed the Indians could not seek legal re-
327. See id. (quoting G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 582 (2d ed. rev.
1980)). The Court also looked for the elements of the common law trust (trustee, beneficiary,
trust corpus), suggesting that, in its view, these elements may be necessary for the imposition
of common law responsibilities.
328. See Cobell v. Babbitt, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999).
329. See Cobell v. Babbit, 37 F. Supp. 2d 6, 11 (D.D.C. 1999). The funds at issue, Individ-
ual Indian Money (I1M') accounts, developed from the allotment era's tribal land disburse-
ments. As the government managed individual parcels under the extended trust period, reve-
nues, rentals, and resource profits accumulated in the trust funds. Since their allotment, most
parcels have passed through nearly seven generations of owners, leaving an average of forty
beneficiaries for each trust parcel today. See Cobell, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 17 n.14.
330. The Cobell plaintiffs presented a two-fold request; a "prospective" court order re-
quiring government to bring its management of IIM accounts in line with common law trust
standards, and a "retrospective" accounting of the money contained in the funds. See Cobell,
37 F. Supp. 2d. at 11.
331. See, e.g., John Gibeaut, Another Broken Trust, AB.A. J., Sept. 1999, at 40.
332. See Cobell, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 28. The distinction between these two types of claims is
critical. The common law claim suggested that, absent statutes, the government stood as
trustee for Indian interests. The statutory claim, by contrast, asserted that such responsibili-
ties arose from the legislation first placing the Indian allotments in trust and from subsequent
statutes governing the management of those trust funds. A common law fiduciary obligation
could attach to either of these substantive arrangements if the expectations of parties and
circumstances supported such an assignment. See supra Part I.
333. See Cobell, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 28-29.
334. See id. (no federal common law), see id. at 30 (asserting that plaintiffs "must point to
rights guaranteed by statute . . . " and reemphasizing the lack of a "persuasive basis" for
claims grounded only in the common law).
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dress when only the historical relationship defined governmental
responsibility.335
Drawing a subtle but important distinction, the court did,
however, acknowledge the appropriateness of attaching common
law fiduciary responsibilities to the government's statutory trust
duties.3 36 The court found that under Mitchell II, where statutes
enumerated specific governmental trust duties, common law fiduci-
ary standards would attach.331 Finding both a comprehensive statu-
tory scheme 338 and pervasive government control within the statu-
tory guidelines,33 9 the court used common law fiduciary standards
to interpret the meaning of the statute's trust responsibilities. 34°
335. See id. at 28-30. Note that the court did not reject the existence of an historical fidu-
ciary relationship, nor negate Mitchell II and Nevada's assertions that that relationship
should play a role in analyzing the appropriate level of responsibility imposed on more specific
substantive responsibilities. While an historical fiduciary relationship may not independently
support a claim, it may structure the analysis of a more confined claim between the parties.
See supra Part I.
336. See id. at 30.
337. See id. The court also contemplated Mitchell II and Nevada to determine the appro-
priate level of governmental responsibility in several preliminary motions. The D.C. court
found that under Mitchell II, in absence of clear congressional intent to the contrary, the gov-
ernment could be held to the standards of a private fiduciary with regard to its statutorily
identified duties. See Cobell v. Babbitt, 30 F. Supp. 2d 24, 33 (D.D.C. 1998). Applying this
reasoning, the court referred to hornbook rules for private trustees in condemning the gov-
ernments behavior during the course of the litigation in its February 1999 decision holding
the Secretary of Interior and Secretary of Treasury in contempt of court for failure to comply
with a document production request. See Cobell v. Babbitt, 37 F. Supp. 2d 6, 23 (D.D.C. 1999)
The court discussed the differences between governmental and private trustees, noting that
while at common law the beneficiary normally creates the trust, the government, through the
exercise of its plenary control, had long ago created the federal/Indian trust relationship. See
Cobell v. Babbit, 52 F. Supp. 2d 11, 15 (D.D.C. 1999). Nevertheless, the court asserted that, in
the nature of the elements involved (trustee, beneficiary, trust corpus), the federal/Indian
relationship mirrored its private counterparts. See id. While the court found the governments
specific duties in the statute, it emphasized that these were not the only sources of govern-
ment responsibility; a significant historical relationship underlay the modern statutory bonds.
See id. at 15-16, n.3. Interpreting Mitchell H, the court determined that common law fiduciary
standards should apply when the government acted under specific statutory guidelines and
asserted pervasive control of the questioned Indian activity. See id. at 22-23. It found that
Mitchell II provided a workable example of how much control it should deem pervasive. See
id. at 23. Furthermore, the court found that Mitchell II required application of the rules of
common law trust responsibility to the unique federal/Indian relationship unless Nevada
exempted the government from the duty of exclusive loyalty because of a conflicting, congres-
sionally-mandated interest. See id. at 26-27. In disputes involving only the government and
the Indians, the D.C. court interpreted Mitchell II to require adherence to the common law's
high-level standards. See id. at 27.
338. See Cobell, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 12-13 (identifying the 1994 Trust Fund Management Re-
form Act, Pub. L. No. 103-412 (1994), as the pertinent statute).
339. See id. at 29-30 (noting that the court could also have found jurisdiction under the
APA's provisions for limited non-statutory review).
340. See id. at 30-33 ("These statutorily based duties must be interpreted in light of the
common law of trusts and the United States's 'Indian Policy.' "). The use of the historical
VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW
Although the government dulled some of the holding's impact
by stipulating before the trial that the "[fjiduciary obligation of the
United States government is not being fulfilled,"8 41 the court recog-
nized its duty to find that in creating a statute, "Congress intended
to impose on trustees traditional fiduciary duties unless [it] . . .
unequivocally expressed an interest to the contrary. ' 342 Thus, the
court held that the government had breached its statutorily defined
trust duties to the Indians as well as the fiduciary obligations at-
tached to them.8 48 The court did not, as the Indians urged, place the
government's trust management under the supervision of a court-
appointed master.34 It did, however, retain jurisdiction over the
case, subject to extension, for five years.34 The decision, a
"victory" 46 for the Indian beneficiaries, confined the scope of gov-
ernmental duties to Mitchell Iis statutory guidelines, 8 47 but effec-
tively embraced Nevada's suggestion that in an activity involving
only the government and the Indians, common law fiduciary stan-
dards should ensure high standards of governmental care and loy-
alty.348
D. The Resulting Doctrine
Read in the shadow of more than 200 years of federal/Indian
history and in the light of recent case law and the canons of Indian
construction, Mitchell H and Nevada reassert the protective force of
the federal/Indian fiduciary bond. While acknowledging that the
fiduciary relationship at this stage reflects Mitchell H and Nevada's assertions of its impor-
tant role in shaping federal/Indian interactions. This Note does not question the Supreme
Courts requirement of specific standards followed here; it merely suggests that in light of a
recognized historical fiduciary relationship, the burden of proof regarding the specificity of the
statutory or control-based standards should fall on the defendant government, not the plaintiff
Indian. See infra Part V.C.
341. Cobell, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 33.
342. Id. at 42 (quoting N.L.R.B. v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 330 (1981)).
343. See id. at 54-55. In so holding, the court recognized the presence of several factors
exaggerating the injuries from the governmenfs breach including the "helpless reliance" of the
Indians on the government and case law's admonition that in its relationship with the Indi-
ans, the government should be judged with the "most exacting fiduciary standards." See id. at
46 (quoting Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942)).
344. See id. at 54-55.
345. See id. at 54-56.
346. See id. at 176 (reminding plaintiffs that they had won as much of a victory as the law
could provide).
347. See id. at 31 (quoting Mitchell fls requirement that specific statutes or regulations
support claims for breach of fiduciary duties).
348. See id. at 32-33 (requiring interpretation of those statutory duties in light of common
law trust duties); see id. at 126 (assuming that "traditional" fiduciary duties will apply).
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historical ties between the two parties may not alone bind the gov-
ernment to high-level common law fiduciary duties, these cases
provide for the application of stringent common law standards in
the face of specific statutory guidelines and comprehensive federal
control.349 The Supreme Court's 1983 decisions suggest that private
fiduciary duties may act as a default standard for government be-
havior in Indian affairs.3 50 While Nevada provides for a specific ex-
ception-relaxation of the duty of exclusive loyalty when Congress
mandates action for a conflicting interest-the common law pro-
vides a base fiduciary standard for federal/Indian interaction. While
simply including the term "trust" in an agreement will not auto-
matically attach common law fiduciary duties, neither will the ab-
sence of the term preclude their application.3 51 The modern analysis
of the federal/Indian relationship takes a contextual approach to
fiduciary determination, generally applying high standards of loy-
alty and care in recognition of the government's extensive control
over Indian life, and acknowledging the importance of an historical
fiduciary tie between the government and the Indians in imposing
these high standards on Indian claims.3 52
The courts' recognition of an on-going, historical fiduciary
relationship, however, is not currently reflected in the administra-
tion of Indian claims. Although Mitchell II and Nevada entitle Indi-
ans to common law protection commensurate with the extent of
government dominance, Indians challenging the government's exer-
cise of its regulatory powers must leap several evidentiary hurdles
before the court will apply common law fiduciary standards to their
claim. Even when seeking purely equitable relief,3 53 Indians must
present sufficient evidence of statutory regulation and pervasive
control before asserting the need for common law fiduciary analysis
of the alleged breaches of duty. This initial burden potentially
shapes the litigation.3 54 Required to produce evidence, frequently in
government hands, in order to prove that the government's statu-
tory or control-based obligations invoke a high standard of care and
349. In heavily regulated areas of Indian affairs (land, timber, oil and gas, water rights)
courts may, under Mitchell 11 and Pawnee, even chose to presume that statutory regulations
are sufficiently specific to require adherence to the common law. See Pawnee v. United States,
830 F.2d 187, 189-90 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (discussing the implications of Mitchell I).
350. See Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 142 (1983).
351. See United States v. Mitchell ('Mitchell Ir'), 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983).
352. See Barsh, supra note 256, at 885-86.
353. A purely equitable claim will avoid the constraints imposed by the Indian Tucker Act.
See supra note 243.
354. See Tamar Frankel, Presumptions and Burdens of Proof as Tools for Legal Stability
and Change, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 759, 759 (1994) [hereinafter Frankel, Presumptions].
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loyalty in handling Indian affairs, 355 the Indians struggle to invoke
the shelter of common law fiduciary protections. The importance of
the burden of proof and its increased significance in cases of fiduci-
ary relationship only accentuates the inequity of such burden allo-
cation.
V. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE FIDUCIARY RELATION:
ASSIGNING THE BURDEN OF PROOF
A. The Significant Role of the Burden of Proof
Among the procedural issues most affected by the fiduciary
relationship is the burden of proof. The singular "burden of proof'
actually denotes two burdens, the initial burden of producing evi-
dence and the subsequent burden of persuading the court. 356 The
burden of production is a "critical mechanism" in establishing a
claim, as failure to produce the required evidence can thwart a
party's case before substantive consideration.357 Even if a party
satisfies this production burden, however, the party still faces the
secondary burden of persuasion. 358 The court's assignment of these
dual burdens often determines the success or failure of the parties
in a litigation.3 59 If a party cannot meet the standards of production
or fails in its attempts at persuasion, its claim may falter before
reaching trial.3 60 The burden of proof, therefore, shapes the litiga-
tion from its outset. Because it wields such great influence, the
burden of proof often acts not only as a procedural "burden," but
also as a powerful tool for legal change.361 Burden allocation affects
the parties' own estimates of their chance of success, as well as in-
creasing or decreasing the cost of presenting their cases.3 62 When
balanced against the importance of the issue under debate, these
factors may encourage parties to pursue or reject claims, to enter
355. See supra Part I.
356. See KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 336 (4th ed. 1992).
357. See id.
358. See id.
359. See Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic
Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1045, 1052 (1991) (explaining that if the
principal party has the burden of demonstrating an agents disloyalty or misconduct, the in-
ability to document this behavior will preclude a successful claim).
360. See id.
361. See Frankel, Presumptions, supra note 357, at 759.
362. See Bruce L. Hay, Allocating the Burden of Proof, 72 IND. L.J. 651, 677-78 (1997).
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settlements, or to engage their causes more vigorously.3 6 3 Thus,
burden placement may change the behavior of parties, discouraging
some claims even before the court evaluates the adequacy of pro-
duction or persuasion.
In most cases, the burden of proof follows the burden of
pleading; thus, the plaintiff will have to produce evidence to sub-
stantiate each of her claims. 364 A plaintiff alleging breach of trust,
for example, must demonstrate the existence of both a trust and a
breach thereof. In certain circumstances, however, the court may
choose to reallocate the burden of proof.3 65 If a plaintiffs claim is
most likely valid, if the plaintiff faces unusual expense in present-
ing evidence or has a great deal at stake, or, if a "wrong" outcome
presents the possibility of great social harm,36 6 the court may
choose to shift the burden of proof to the defendant. If the court re-
peatedly allocates the burden of proof to the defendant for a certain
type of case, the placement will become standard, reflecting the
court's understanding of the "status quo" between the parties.36 7 A
party adhering to the court's status predictions benefits from a pre-
sumption of correctness, while a party challenging the established
"norm" must both produce evidence and adequately persuade the
court before altering the status quo. If these burdens prove unduly
great, their allotment may deter further challenges to the norm.3 68
Through repeated allocation, the burden of proof develops a favor-
able protection for the court's interpretation of the existing situa-
tion.369
B. The Effect of the Fiduciary Relationship
The historical fiduciary relationship between the government
and the Indians assigns federal/Indian interactions to the often
"elusive" realm of fiduciary law.3 70 Fiduciary relationships may
range from the formal agreements between trustees and benefici-
aries, agents and principals, or guardians and wards, to the more
personal encounters between doctors and patients, administrators
363. See id. at 678.
364. See BROUN, supra note 356, at §336.
365. See Hay, supra note 362, at 675.
366. See id.
367. See Frankel, Presumptions, supra note 354, at 763.
368. See id. This may either deter valid claims or, when appropriately utilized, provide
necessary protection for an existing social relationship.
369. See id.
370. See DeMott, supra note 12, at 879.
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and employees, and even parents and children.371 While seemingly
diverse, in each of these interactions, a "fiduciary" holds the power
and responsibility to act on behalf and in the interests of the "en-
trustor."37 2 Courts may attach fiduciary responsibility to a particu-
lar relationship because it is of a recognized, previously established
fiduciary nature (the archetype model),373 because the purpose of
the relationship is to serve the interests of only one party (the pur-
pose model),374 or because the elements of dependence, vulnerabil-
ity, influence, trust and dominance signal the presence of a fiduci-
ary relationship (the circumstantial model).3 75 These structural
similarities unite and connect the unique relationships before the
law, reflecting the expectations of the parties, and the courts, that a
heightened standard of care and loyalty should guide behavior
within these interactions.3 76
Traditionally, abused entrustors turned to courts of equity for
breach of confidence remedies. 77 Today, laws binding fiduciaries to
duties of care and loyalty protect the interests of entrustors from
the inherent risks of delegating power and privilege to others.378
Within the obligations of relationship, the extent of powers dele-
gated and the availability of other protections, like supervision,37 9
may cause the court to view a fiduciary's responsibilities to his en-
trustor more or less strictly.380 If, for example, a beneficiary em-
powers a trustee only to manage a specific piece of land, the court
will impose duties far less strict than the standards of care and loy-
alty imposed on a trustee with complete control of an estate's af-
fairs. 381 Even within a single relationship, fiduciary duties may ap-
ply to only some areas of interaction.38 2
Unlike a contractual relationship in which the terms and in-
tent of the parties' agreement define their interactions, more gen-
371. See Frankel, Fiduciary Law, supra note 14, at 795-96.
372. See id. at 800.
373. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
374. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
375. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
376. See Frankel, Fiduciary Law, supra note 14, at 799.
377. See DeMott, supra note 12, at 880; see also supra Part I.
378. See Frankel, Fiduciary Law, supra note 14, at 808.
379. See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules, 74 OR. L. REV. 1209,1212
(1995) [hereinafter Frankel, Default Rules] (describing the difficulties of maintaining adequate
safeguards in the fiduciary relationship).
380. See Frankel, Fiduciary Law, supra note 14, at 810.
381. See id.
382. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (explaining that what is fiduciary for one
purpose may not be fiduciary for all purposes).
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eral moral and ethical ties bind the parties in a fiduciary relation-
ship.38 3 As "[e]ven entrustors who are in a strong bargaining posi-
tion before they enter the relationship become vulnerable immedi-
ately after they entrust power or property to their fiduciaries," 38
courts will generally subsume the specific terms of an agreement to
the need for institutionalized protections of the entrusting party.3 85
Recognizing that most entrustors lack the resources and ability to
monitor the work of their fiduciaries to ensure it meets the common
law's high standards of duty and care, especially when those fiduci-
aries are large public entities, courts develop and impose substan-
tive and procedural guidelines to ensure the benefits and security of
the entrustor.3 86 While not wanting to discourage parties from en-
tering relationships in the dominant fiduciary role, courts have
demonstrated a belief that the fiduciary alone should bear the cost
of protecting the entrustor within the relationship.38 7
This desire to protect fiduciary relationships leads to deliber-
ate allocation of the burden of proof in claims for breach of fiduciary
duties. At common law, when a court recognizes a fiduciary rela-
tionship as well established, it will allot the burden of proving the
relationship's existence to the defendant fiduciary rather than to
the plaintiff entrustor.388 Because the appearance of an on-going
relationship increases the likelihood that the plaintiffs characteri-
zation is accurate, and because, for an entrustor, the costs of pro-
ducing evidence to demonstrate the existence of a fiduciary rela-
tionship may be prohibitively high,3 89 the court shapes the litigation
around an initial presumption favoring the plaintiffs assertion of
fiduciary duties. The court's burden allocation acknowledges and
supports the status quo, requiring the established fiduciary to dis-
prove the relationship, rather than demanding that the entrustor
383. See Frankel, Fiduciary Law, supra note 14, at 830; DeMott, supra note 12, at 887.
384. See Frankel, Default Rules, supra note 379, at 1216.
385. See DeMott, supra note 12, at 887 (observing that a "fiduciary obligation sometimes
operates precisely in opposition to intention as manifest in express agreements.").
386. See Frankel, Default Rules, supra note 379, at 1212, 1275. Additionally, because the
government has so much more power than an individual or corporate actor, an act by a fiduci-
ary will pose a greater risk of harm when that fiduciary is a governmental rather than a cor-
porate public entity. See generally PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT 64 (1983) (observ-
ing that, by virtue of the, governments authority, a government actor has a greater capacity
than a private fiduciary to do harm).
387. See Frankel, Fiduciary Law, supra note 14, at 834.
388. See Hay, supra note 362, at 674.
389. See Cooter & Freedman, supra note 359, at 1052 (explaining that the difficulty of
proving a relationship is fiduciary is particularly great for the entrustor because evidence of
action or inaction usually lies with the fiduciary who has been charged to act on the entrus-
tor's behalf).
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substantiate its existence.390 Similar provisions, allowing the court
to shift the burden of proof to the defendant fiduciary in cases of
apparent mismanagement or self-dealing, reemphasize this idea.391
Through these recognitions of existing relationships, the court uses
burden allocation to protect the beneficiary's "trust" in his fiduci-
ary.392
C. The Burden of Proof in Federal/Indian Trust Claims Under
Mitchell II and Nevada
At common law, when the court deems a fiduciary relation-
ship firmly established, the burden of proof for demonstrating basic
responsibility shifts from the claimant beneficiary to the defending
fiduciary.393 Not so for the Indian plaintiff. Despite the firm histori-
cal foundation for a binding fiduciary relationship between the gov-
ernment and the Indians, the beneficiary Indian, under Mitchell II,
must prove sufficient regulation and control to justify application of
private fiduciary standards.3 94 Furthermore, under Nevada, the
beneficiary Indian, not the defending government, must show that
Congress has not mandated conflicting responsibilities to the gov-
ernment, which would excuse adherence to the strict common law
standards of loyalty.3 95 While Mitchell II and Nevada expanded the
applicability of common law protections to the federal/Indian rela-
tionship, without procedural revisions, their principles bring little
real change.
Such change, however, is possible. Mitchell II and Nevada re-
affirmed the Court's earlier declarations of governmental responsi-
bility.3 96 In both cases, the Court cited Seminole's assertions that
the federal/Indian relationship was a unique, protective bond.397
Using the Seminole analysis to support modern requirements of
specificity, control, and exclusive interaction for the imposition of
390. See id. at 1075.
391. See Frankel, Fiduciary Law, supra note 14, at 824-25.
392. See Frankel, Presumptions, supra note 354, at 776. Notably, as Professor Randall
Thomas of Vanderbilt University Law School suggested, the court in corporate cases generally
requires the plaintiff to prove facts suggesting some violation of this fiduciary bond before
allowing plaintiffs to proceed with their claim.
393. See Hay, supra note 362, at 674.
394. United States v. Mitchell ("Mitchell r'), 463 U.S. 206, 222, 225 (1983).
395. Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 141-42 (1983). While it may be possible for
Indians to document these preliminary issues through normal discovery, that discovery will
often prove difficult when the necessary evidence lays in government control.
396. Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 225; Nevada, 463 U.S. at 127.
397. See Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 225; Nevada, 463 U.S. at 127.
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fiduciary responsibilities, the Court suggested that this long recog-
nized fiduciary relationship, in the particular circumstances, de-
served the full protections of the common law.
The law relating to federal/Indian relations is established.
Mitchell I1 and Nevada codified and confirmed 200 years of policy
and interpretation. As early as 1791, President George Washington,
in his annual address to Congress, asserted the importance of act-
ing with philanthropy towards "an unenlightened race of men,
whose happiness materially depends on the conduct of the United
States. ' 398 Chief Justice Marshall referenced the same dependant
relationship in resolving the Cherokee Cases, describing the gov-
ernment's responsibility toward the Indians as like that of a
guardian to his ward.3 99 The Court drew power from the recognized
federal/Indian relationship during the expansionist 1880s to justify
increasing governmental encroachment on Indian territory.400 To-
day, the existence of that trust relationship supports the very defi-
nition of Indian identity.4° 1 The fiduciary relationship espoused in
Mitchell 11 and Nevada is not a new creation of the Court. It reflects
the product of the 200 year evolution of Indian law.
The application of that law, however, remains subject to
change. Recognizing the principles behind Mitchell II and Nevada-
the presence of a general fiduciary relationship and the protection
of the Indian canons of construction-courts should shift the burden
of establishing Mitchell II and Nevada's statutory and control-based
dominance necessary to justify the imposition of common law fidu-
ciary obligations from the plaintiff Indian to the defendant govern-
ment in breach of duty claims. The Court has recognized that in the
federal/Indian relationship, the substantive supports for fiduciary
duties arise not only from the particular regulations and govern-
ment actions in individual cases,402 but also from a more pervasive,
historical fiduciary bond between the government and the
Indians.403 A court, with the support of a 200 year record, may rea-
sonably presume that the elements of trust, vulnerability, domi-
nance, influence and dependence underlie every interaction be-
398. See President Washington's Third Annual Message (October 25, 1791), in DOCUMENTS
OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY (Francis Paul Prucha, ed., 2d ed. 1975) (emphasis added).
399. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
400. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 382-385 (1886).
401. See DESKBOOK, supra note 29, at 28.
402. See Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 219-20.
403. See id. at 225; Nevada, 463 U.S. at 127.
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tween the government and the Indians.4 4 Furthermore, the court
may also, on the basis of a thorough historical demonstration, pre-
sume that the expectations of the parties and even the purpose of
the agreement, suggest a fiduciary relationship. Acting on these
well-founded assumptions, the court may fairly place on the gov-
ernment the burden of disproving a 200 year status quo, of showing
that the Mitchell II standards of statutory specificity and broad
control and the Nevada requirement of exclusive interaction are not
met.405
Even faced with such a burden, the government needs little
to rebut a court's assumptions in cases in which such standards
should not apply. To rebut the presumption of the applicability of
common law fiduciary duties, the government need only show that
1) it has a congressional mandate requiring a division of loyalties,
thus permitting, under Nevada's exception, a lower standard of loy-
alty and care for execution of government responsibilities; 4 6 2) that
it lacks specific statutory guidelines in this area of administration
and thus cannot be held for violation of any particular duty;40 7 or
3) that control of this area of Indian affairs has returned to the In-
dians to an extent sufficient to divest the government of the re-
quired "pervasive" control. 408 Establishing any of these three ele-
ments could return the burden to the Indian plaintiff to justify ap-
plication of the common law rules.
The burden, for the government, is not a difficult one to bear.
Arguably, if the government may so easily satisfy these require-
ments, there is no reason to shift the burden at all. The important
question, however, is not the practical size of the burden on the
government, but the inherent unfairness, in light of history and the
rules of fiduciary law, of leaving that burden with the Indian plain-
tiffs on whom it currently falls. The government may have to do
little to address the shifted burden, but even that little represents
an important step towards fair resolution of Indian claims. Mitchell
H and Nevada crystallized Indian law's acknowledgement of the
imbalanced, but on-going, federal/Indian relationship. Reallocation
of the burden of proof in Indian claims against the government can
404. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (explaining the circumstantial model of fi-
duciary relationships).
405. See supra note 392-94 (discussing the burden of proof in cases of established fiduciary
relationship at common law).
406. See supra note 295 (exploring the possible standards of care under the Nevada excep-
tion).
407. See Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 224.
408. See id. at 222.
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apply that acknowledgment to the resolution of disputes throughout
Indian law.
VI. CONCLUSION
"Great nations, like great men, should keep their word."40 9
The Supreme Court has taken the government's duty towards the
Indians very seriously. In its Mitchell II and Nevada decisions, the
Court raised the bar for government behavior, affirming the trend
towards exclusive emphasis of the protective nature of the fed-
eral/Indian relationship that Marshall first contemplated in
1831.410 In administering subsequent cases, lower courts should not
ignore the Supreme Court's mandate. Without a reallocation of the
burden of proof, the Supreme Court's standards offer little real
change. Great nations, like great men, keep their word. The United
States, despite repeated promises to the Indians, has not fulfilled
its fiduciary obligations. 411 If the burden of proof is reallocated for
Indian breach of fiduciary duty claims, however, this nation may,
after two hundred years, begin to keep its promise to protect the
Indians. While courts "cannot simply take over the role of [an]
agency,"412 controlling and mandating the government's role in In-
dian affairs, they can, by enforcing their recognition of the govern-
ment's fiduciary obligations and thus shifting the burden of proof in
pure federal/Indian claims, begin to make a change.
Eugenia Allison Phipps*
409. Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 142 (1960) (Black,
J., dissenting).
410. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
411. See Cobell v. Babbitt, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1, 53 (D.D.C. 1999) (including trial testimony of
Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbit affirming the long history of government fiduciary obli-
gation to the Indians and the governmenes longstanding awareness of its failure to live up to
that obligation).
412. Id. at 53-54 (explaining why plaintiffs remedies are limited by the scope of legal
remedies).
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